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Andrew Kirsch: It’s high time for CSIS to step out of the shadows and speak up 

Commentary

People cast their shadows as they walk in Toronto, Feb. 27, 2012. Nathan Denette/The Canadian Press.

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The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), informally referred to as “The Service,” turned 40 this past week. It’s an occasion that justifies a rethink of the agency, including its mandate and operational processes, in the face of new and emerging threats to Canadian security.

CSIS a relatively young organization. Born out of the FLQ crisis in Quebec and the McDonald Commission that followed, it was the last official bill passed by Pierre Trudeau’s government in 1984. I don’t suspect many people know that. In fact, in a poll conducted a few years ago, respondents were asked, unaided, “if they could name the organization that is responsible for investigating threats to Canada.” Just three in 10 were able to identify the organization as CSIS. Roughly six in 10 (63 percent) were unsure.

While all indications suggest the secretive organization is happy with its low public profile, it can be a pain for the people who work there. I served as an intelligence officer at CSIS for just under a decade. As a collector in the field, my job was to knock on doors and ask people for help with our national security investigations. I would introduce myself as an intelligence officer and describe CSIS’s mandate and be met with mostly blank stares. Many confused CSIS with the CIA or the RCMP. Now that I am out of the organization and tell people where I worked, I am often confronted with the same confused looks. “We have Canadian spies?” they ask.

I believe the time has come for CSIS to step out of the shadows and grow up. First, because it is not a clandestine service. It’s often said that CSIS is not a secret organization but an organization with secrets. It’s also a domestic security service, relying on the help of Canadians for its investigations—recruiting human sources from local communities and serving warrants to Canadian businesses to gather threat-related information. It would be nice that if an intelligence officer knocked on your door you knew what organization that person was from, what information they were interested in, and felt comfortable working with them. Even better, if you felt confident and comfortable enough to report threats to the organization mandated to investigate them.

Thanks to the media, a subset of the Canadian population does know what CSIS is. But they often only hear about the organization when something has gone wrong, where readers or viewers are only left with a generic and brief quote given by a faceless representative.

At a time when trust in our institutions is reaching record lows it’s important for CSIS to share more; celebrating successes, defending itself, or providing a unique point of view to inform the public.

Being an unknown entity has not served us well. The low visibility and credibility have meant that when CSIS does step out into the spotlight, only a few people listen.

Consider 2010, when CSIS director Richard Fadden told the CBC that certain Canadian politicians were under the influence of foreign governments. Fadden was hounded to resign for discussing the legitimate threats that we are today learning were almost definitely true—threats that only got worse when we did not heed his warning.

More recently, I can’t help but think about the foreign interference inquiry where we saw a parade of senior government officials, including the prime minister, publicly question the work of CSIS, with Director David Vigneault left on his own to defend it. Had we not seen the same troubling intelligence that Fadden had warned us about nearly 15 years ago reveal itself, he would also have been ignored.

CSIS is not blameless in all this. It has not been a willing participant in the public debate. The current foreign interference conversation (while important) was initially prompted by the selective leaks of highly sensitive information to journalists from those in the intelligence community. It’s a conversation that was started the wrong way. I believe we could still be having this conversation, without leaks, if CSIS had allowed more vetted information in the public domain. The public inquiry as well as reports from NSICOP and NSIRA demonstrate it is possible to share more.

So, what is holding us back? Or rather, why are we allowing CSIS to keep its hand so close to the vest against Canadians’ interests? Intelligence officers are subject to the Security of Information Act (SOIA). The most important thing—aside from protecting sensitive information—is how we collect that information. This is casually referred to as “sources and methods.” But today a blanket can be thrown over all the information CSIS or the government doesn’t want you to have. Often that is for good reason: we cannot allow our adversaries to know how we collect information about them as it would allow them to better protect themselves.

But, ask anybody in the Canadian national security community, academia, or the media and they will tell you we have a terrible habit of over-classifying and over-restricting information. The “sources and methods” argument is being applied too broadly and is not being weighed against the value of providing awareness of the threat and sensitizing the public to what they and we may need to do to combat it.

I have experienced this first-hand. A few years ago, after leaving CSIS and getting many questions from friends, family, and some young people interested in a career in national security, I decided to write a book about my experience as an intelligence officer. This wasn’t a policy book or a tell-all. Just my story about what it was like to be a Canadian spy. I wanted to stay as clear from the SOIA red line as possible. The aim was to be entertaining, but also informative—giving Canadians a look into the challenging and sometimes strange but also fun world of espionage.

But I found there is no formal system to get a book reviewed by CSIS—probably another sign of the organization’s youth. While I was under no obligation to clear it, I requested feedback. What I discovered was a great deal of uncertainty in law and practice about what that red line is. Meanwhile, those enforcing it have no interest in exploring where the boundaries should be.

At one point, a passing reference to the make of a particular van was removed from my memoir. When I questioned this very specific redaction I was told it was because it revealed a vehicle used by CSIS. Never mind that it was one of the most ubiquitous vans on the market and manufactured in Ontario and thus important to drive to blend in.

It was a minor change so I didn’t really care. I did however find it funny that only a few years earlier CSIS had released a recruitment video for their “surveillants,” featuring a suspiciously familiar van.

I am proud of where I worked, what I accomplished, and the important work my former colleagues continue to do. But I am also embarrassed when I see our organization so easily marginalized and dismissed when I know the exceptional people who work there and the critical intelligence they are gathering to protect Canadians. CSIS is not a big service but it does punch above its weight. You’d never know that from its minuscule profile, but you should.

In addition to CSIS turning 40 this month, we also recently saw the retirement of CSIS Director David Vigneault. The selection of the next director and CSIS turning middle age is an opportunity for the organization to step out of the shadows. We have now reached a critical moment in the conversation about foreign interference. We have an NSICOP report that says there are parliamentarians who may have wittingly colluded with foreign governments against Canada’s national security interests. Meanwhile, the federal government is refusing to release names and, as an excuse, citing skepticism around CSIS intelligence which suggested foreign states interfered in the 2019 and 2021 elections.

It appears we may be heading into the next election without the public knowing who the alleged politicians are and whether they are on the ballot again. We’ve also seen minimal changes to the nomination process which was identified as a weak point in our democratic system. It’s a devastating indictment of CSIS that this bombshell of intelligence could be so easily dismissed by politicians and so easily ignored by Canadians. What is the point of having an intelligence service if the government won’t listen and the public doesn’t seem to care?

We need to protect true sources and methods. But we should not shield the public from the very real threats they face, the adversaries who are threatening them, and the fact that there are those working day and night—knocking on doors, taking part in surveillance, and conducting covert operations—to keep them safe.

At a time when the threats are rising and our government is openly defying CSIS—claiming they do not read their reports and do not take their advice seriously—we need a vocal mature, confident, and trusted intelligence service in the national conversation.

Andrew Kirsch

Andrew Kirsch served as an intelligence officer with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) for 10 years. His memoir "I Was Never Here: My True Canadian Spy Story of Coffees, Code Names, and Covert Operations" was a national bestseller. He is currently CEO of Kirsch Group, a security risk consulting…...

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