Enjoying The Hub?
Sign up for our free newsletter!

Kirk LaPointe: Is Kevin Falcon the new John Turner?

Commentary

BC United Leader, Kevin Falcon during a news conference in Surrey, B.C., June 26, 2024. Ethan Cairns/The Canadian Press.

Kevin Falcon’s decision in 2012 to leave British Columbian politics was understandable, as was his decision in 2022 to return.

His decision in 2024 not to leave again—to not unite the Right as an election looms, to not resign before he even finishes his first campaign as a party leader—is shaping up to be the most significant decision in B.C. politics in a generation.

And it has been a lot less understandable.

Falcon’s first departure a dozen years ago wasn’t much of a surprise. He had lost in the BC Liberals’ leadership race to Christy Clark a year earlier, so the top role would be sealed off for some time. He had a young family, and you only get to experience those years in that way once. And there was money galore to be made with a prominent real estate developer, so financial opportunity knocked.

But his departure left a discernible gap in the ruling party—that of a strong-willed, high-octane, heavy-lifting, can-do quality that drew admiration inside and trepidation outside it. He had held the most senior portfolios to reflect that prowess: he was the Finance minister and deputy premier when he departed and had manned Health and transportation and been a red-tape-cutting minister of state for Deregulation—a job that he relished—along the way.

Falcon’s reputation only progressed in the private sector, as it can when a politician graduates into business. Eventually, too, follows an appetite within a political party in its throes to retrieve that talent in the belief of the saviour narrative in politics, premised on the idea of the leader-in-waiting.

In several respects it made Falcon the party’s John Turner: a successful post-politics figure envisioned as a compelling and agile solution for a party in need of an exciting injection of leadership. Four decades ago that described the federal Liberals under the fatigued Pierre Trudeau, and in 2022 it described the lacklustre BC Liberals under Andrew Wilkinson.

Falcon’s ascension to the leadership had strong but not overwhelming caucus support, much like Turner’s 1984 campaign, and his victory was also far from friction-free—a fifth-ballot win after his rivals accused his campaign of irregularities in membership sign-ups. It was a messier-than-usual leadership race that, in hindsight, now seems to have been a sign of Turner-like turmoil to come.

Upon reentering the legislature as Opposition leader, Falcon didn’t find just any rival across the aisle. He found John Horgan, the country’s most popular premier and a more centrist NDP leader who, of all things, balanced the budget. Even his opponents in the private sector had to admit he was pretty damned good in the job.

Only months into their rivalry, however, Horgan resigned as premier, stricken with cancer (he subdued it, but it has since returned). The NDP then chose in David Eby a leader who shifted the party leftward, contentedly produced deficits, and expanded taxes, social programs and the public service—and presumably provided a better target for Falcon.

Even so, public opinion didn’t penalize the NDP and there was little gravitation to the BC Liberals. Horgan’s halo adorned Eby, and Falcon found it hard to define his leadership. Like Turner’s caucus rift back in the day, he also had party divisions in the amalgam of conservatives and liberals alike in the BC Liberals fold.

Then came two serious unforced, inadvertent errors—ideas that looked good and then didn’t.

The first involved firing a former cabinet colleague, MLA John Rustad, because he questioned the extent of human contribution to climate change—hardly a radical view in a province dependent on resource development. A Tweet expressed skepticism of the science on the matter, which was a stance at odds with party policy. Wilkinson had taken criticism for tolerating social and climate conservatives, and the new leader wanted to demonstrate new boundaries. So Rustad was booted, and on his birthday, no less.

Rustad was unlikely to run again in 2024, but Falcon’s firing proved more of a backfiring. It rejuvenated Rustad, who joined the BC Conservative Party, assumed its leadership a month later, and made a home for those disaffected in Falcon’s fold. In little more than a year, it has gone from four to about 40 percent support in the province and in a statistical margin-of-error tie with Eby’s party. Its ascent coincides with the descent of Falcon’s party. How tough has it been? Even if a significant number in the province don’t know Rustad, he is still more popular than Falcon.

The second error involved a regrettable rebrand. The BC Liberals had been a coalition of everyone to the Right of the NDP, dating back to the 1990s. Falcon surmised, among other things, that conservatives didn’t like the nomenclature, and so the party renamed itself BC United. A year-and-a-half later, nearly one-third of voters don’t know that, so Falcon has asked ElectionsBC to include both the current and former party names next to his candidates when the province votes in two months. If the new name is reminiscent of a soccer team, the ballot maneuver is reminiscent of The Artist Formerly Known As Prince.

In essence, Falcon tried to assuage conservatives with a name change, but they fled and fled and fled because he couldn’t assuage conservatives with anything else as red-meat policy.

There has proven to be a combination of factors working against Falcon so far: a yesterday’s man image akin to Turner’s 1984 rust; a problem with differentiating the party from the NDP without losing the centrist vote; the confusing rebrand; a housing crisis that they’ve been unable to propose any meaningful solutions to; and the siphoning of the conservative vote to the Conservatives.

Depending on the poll, BC United is either in single-digits or rock-bottom double digits, and seat projections suggest zero, one, or maybe two MLAs among the 93 candidates will be elected on October 19. Falcon insists polls are faulty, that Rustad is only riding federal Conservative coattails that will soon be yanked from him, and that if he can just somehow show people he’s a capable alternative then everything will be fine.

But many wise elders in the party are telling him enough is enough, that it’s time to fold the big tent that accommodated such differing views for so long. They worry Falcon is an impediment to the unseating of the NDP—that his prolonged presence is in fact the government’s greatest asset if BC United and the Conservative Party of BC split the vote on the Right. Falcon is indignant and in a Joe Biden-like denial for the time being, and the value of his resignation diminishes as days pass and the Conservatives produce even better poll numbers.

If regime change at all costs is the objective, Falcon ought to be stepping aside for the sake of voters who want change. But if BC United party preservation is the objective, or if the party doesn’t believe the Conservatives would win even with their support, then it’s understandable that Falcon believes he should stay on and maintain BC United as a distinct entity from the Conservative Party of BC. An amalgamation would be a point of no return—not just for him, but for the party that has governed B.C. for two-thirds of this century. It ought to happen, but it looks as if it won’t.

Kirk LaPointe is a transplanted Ontarian to British Columbia. Before he left, he ran CTV News, Southam News and the Hamilton Spectator. He also helped launch the National Post as its first executive editor, was a day-one host on CBC Newsworld, and ran the Ottawa bureau of The Canadian Press.…...

Ginny Roth: There’s no such thing as money for nothing

Commentary

OpenAI CEO Sam Altman participates during the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Jan. 18, 2024. Markus Schreiber/AP Photo.

Despite Canada’s biggest province having recently undertaken a universal basic income (UBI) pilot of its own, there’s been very little discussion in our country about the results of a robust American study of the policy approach’s effectiveness. And when I say robust, Sam Altman-backed OpenResearch’s initiative was the Cadillac of studies. A big, honking randomized control trial over a three-year timeline, with impressive influence over external variables (they even got the State of Illinois to pass legislation to make sure) and data collection.

The researchers put the results out in July, setting off a flurry of analysis. Some UBI optimists (often the same optimists with a utopian view of the technology that might make UBI suddenly more relevant) plumbed the depths of the data, trying to put a positive spin on the results, and a number of mainstream media outlets reported on the results with a neutral to slightly positive spin.

But aside from those predisposed to see the upside, most could not avoid the glaring, and seemingly conclusive, results around the impact of cash grants on work. Not only did the UBI not increase health outcomes or lead recipients to skill or train up, but the space created by UBI seems to have mostly been taken up by leisure. In fact, it reduced labour market participation, and, most damningly, reduced income overall.

In other words, it turns out that despite its adherent’s insistence, UBI is not a revolutionary policy tool but rather a far more expensive, far less targeted, far more inefficient way to alleviate poverty—in most cases achieving what various other tax credit and income support programs already do, while disincentivizing work and ultimately hurting economic growth.

As it turns out, if you give too many people too much cash, they work less.

Ginny Roth is a Partner at Crestview Strategy and a long-time conservative activist who most recently served as the Director of Communications on Pierre Poilievre’s Conservative leadership campaign.

00:00:00
00:00:00