Alisha Rao: Canada must get its relationship with India back on track

Two weeks ago, the tit-for-tat expulsion of diplomats from Canada and India sparked a new level of deterioration in the Canada-India relationship.

From a thousand-foot perspective, how such a breakdown could have happened is puzzling. India is the world’s largest democracy, a long-time ally and commonwealth partner, and a rising power in an increasingly important strategic region of the world. Canada has lately emphasized the need for a renewed Indo-Pacific strategy. It would seem to follow, then, that cultivating a stronger, more integrated relationship with India should be priority number one in that endeavour.

And yet, the past year has shown anything but. Last September, Justin Trudeau stood up in the House of Commons and alleged that Indian agents backed by the Indian government were behind the murder of a Canadian citizen, Hardeep Singh Nijjar, on Canadian soil last June. Relations have been increasingly rocky since.

Ultimately, Canada is right to confront India about the seriousness of the extrajudicial crimes committed on Canadian soil; that does not mean avoiding the self-examination necessary to determine where Canada has made mistakes in handling its relationship with India. These are not mutually exclusive exercises.

Canada’s allies and India

Since his announcement in the House of Commons, Trudeau has mentioned that Canada has been in touch with our Five Eyes allies, such as the U.K. and U.S., who have stated that they have “full confidence” in the Canadian judicial system and “the Government of India’s cooperation with Canada’s legal process is the next step,” as mentioned in a recent Globe and Mail article. U.S. State Department spokesman Matthew Miller agreed with this statement. But what is not being reported in the Globe and Mail is that Miller has also stated the following:

“India continues to be an incredibly strong partner of the United States. We’ve worked with them on a number of matters including our shared vision for a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific, and when we have concerns, we have the kind of relationship where we can take those concerns to them and have very frank, candid conversations about those concerns, and that’s what we’ve been doing.”

Our neighbour and largest trading partner provides the best example of working diplomatically with India to resolve an issue before it boils over. Last year, an assassination attempt was made on a dual American-Canadian citizen, Gurpatwant Singh Pannu, in the U.S. It was successfully averted, and India cooperated with the U.S. to investigate the potential link back to a government official. Crucially, the U.S. did not directly and publicly accuse the Indian government.

The U.K. as well, even as they support us now and encourage India to cooperate, continues to pursue trade deals and economic opportunities with India. Australia is finding different ways to work with India, including the Australia-India Institute, as they belong to the Quad (Japan, India, Australia, and the U.S.), which is committed to the vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”

Other allies of ours have multi-pronged approaches to their relationship with India as the country simultaneously cozies up to the West and works closely with autocrats like Vladimir Putin in Russia. Canada is more and more removed from these conversations, and our Indo-Pacific strategy is becoming more difficult to implement. While India remains a significant market for “several Canadian commodities, including lentils, fertilizer, and coal,” it is important to acknowledge that our own relationship with India, outside of business, is fraught in a unique way.

Canada’s diaspora politics problem

Canada has allowed diaspora politics to play a disproportionate role in how we conduct diplomacy with other countries. This is most evident in our relationship with India.

The U.K., Australia, and the U.S. all have Sikh diasporas as Canada does, but compared to them, Canada’s Sikh population is the largest, with slightly over 2 percent of the population, compared to the U.S. with 0.08 percent. The byproduct of having a comparatively larger Sikh diaspora means there is an active community of Sikh separatists in Canada who push for the creation of Khalistan, the region of Punjab, as a distinct state from India.

This, unsurprisingly, is a major issue of contention with the Indian government and has fuelled the diplomatic tension. India’s longstanding criticism of Canada is rooted in its belief that we are willing hosts to extremist Khalistani elements, and in allowing these separatist movements the freedom to organize, Canada is tolerating terrorism. India sees Canada as prioritizing these sub-diasporic interests over the concerns of the Indian government, not taking them seriously in the way many of our allies are.

There is some truth here.

I have written previously on the trauma behind separation in the Indian region, and why Indians regard any language suggesting violence towards and the separation of their country as a national security threat. I have also written on Canada’s failure to prevent the Air India bombing in 1985, orchestrated by Khalistani terrorists who were members of Babbar Khalsa, a registered terrorist group. Incidentally, Pierre Trudeau refused to extradite Parmar in 1984, the mastermind behind the bombing, before the attack. Canada’s continuous failure to acknowledge the bombing as a Canadian tragedy has left our worst terrorist attack lost to our collective memory. Our allies do not have this kind of shared history with India.

We have seen ample evidence of identity politics taking precedence, including the removal of “Sikh terrorism” from the 2018 report on terrorism threats to Canada, Trudeau only putting out a press statement to acknowledge the Air India bombing victims, the federal budget dedicating at least part of a proposed $11 million package to a Sikh heritage museum space in Toronto, Liberal MP Sukh Dhaliwal’s recent sponsoring of a petition to re-evaluate the Air India bombing case to investigate whether the Indian government was behind it (an idea that has been debunked in exhaustive inquiries and proven given the perpetrators were Khalistani terrorists who possessed Canadian citizenship), and the government not adequately denouncing floats or imagery that promote violence.

Stephen Harper’s past Conservative government demonstrated the clearest signal of recognizing India’s territorial integrity, but there has been backsliding since Trudeau took over and the issue has arisen again. It was also only recently that David Morrison, the deputy minister of foreign affairs, said that Canada believes in “absolute support” for India’s territorial integrity.

Yet these gaps in addressing Khalistani extremism have been evidenced recently, including the government not adequately recognizing the defacing of Hindu temples (including one in Edmonton), as well as the unchecked presence of “wanted”-style posters of Indian High Commissioner Sanjay Kumar Verma and Toronto Consul General Apoorva Srivastava outside of gurudwaras.

Former Premier of B.C., Ujjal Dosanjh, who has been vocal in opposing extremism, violence, and discussing the Air India bombing (who faced death threats in 2010 and was attacked in the 1980s by Khalistani extremists), stressed that “the Khalistani extremism is the strongest and most entrenched in Canada,” while there is no desire for Khalistan in India.

Ryan Touhey, an associate professor of history at St. Jerome’s University has commented that Canada is “repeatedly missing signals from Delhi regarding Indian concerns over pro-Khalistani elements in Canada.” It is important to emphasize that this is an issue that predates the Air India bombing. Touhey has written in his chapter for the India Migration Report 2024: Indians in Canada that:

“Bill Warden [Canada’s High Commissioner in the early 80s], was summoned a record 18 times to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs to discuss the problem [of Sikh extremism]. From the Indian perspective, Ottawa was not doing enough to rein in the growth of Sikh extremism in Canada—an issue that culminated in the Air India bombing of June 1985.”

Warden would later explain that he shared India’s frustration at the time, and was also not provided necessary intelligence that could have led to the prevention of the bombing.

What now?

At the end of the day, however, these factors in no way justify the Indian government’s targeting of Canadian citizens, nor does it mean that all pro-Khalistani organizing in Canada must be suppressed. But Canada can do a better job of listening to India’s overall concerns.

For its part, India has remained adamant that the claims made against its agents that kicked off this incident are unfounded. The Indian government has expressed distrust in the Canadian government. Sanjay Verma himself has refuted the claims of his involvement in any criminal activity. India’s Minister of External Affairs, S. Jaishankar, has spoken out a week after the tit-for-tat expulsions, suggesting a double standard in the definition of foreign interference. He further added that the threats made to Sanjay Verma (including the posters) also impact how India will proceed in installing a future high commissioner to Canada.

A recent CBC article notes that Canada is currently linking the infamous Bishnoi gang to India’s government; foreign ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal has called this “strange,” as India has requested 26 extradition requests (including those belonging to the Bishnoi gang) which he says have been ignored by Canada. These viewpoints expressed by Indian officials show that India and Canada remain at an impasse.

We are entering uncharted territory as it relates to Canada’s relationship with India. For Canada’s part, turning a blind eye to any amount of extremism on its soil in the name of domestic political purposes is no longer tenable. Phil Gurski, who has spent 32 years in Canadian intelligence, including 15 with CSIS and the OPP Anti-Terrorism Section, spoke to me on the current tensions, explaining that “a pre-existing terrorist entity that has not achieved its goal does not go away,” and recommends that Canada should continue to monitor the Sikh profile and Babbar Khalsa.

Canada must forcefully and without compromise protect its citizens and territory from foreign interference of any kind. It must also better address the legitimate concerns of our allies, all while maintaining the freedom of peaceful political assembly on our soil. All of these priorities must be taken seriously. Canada’s next government must find a way to better harmonize these than the current government has managed. The relationship with an increasingly important ally hangs in the balance.