David Coletto: Is there even still a ‘centre’ in Canadian politics?

Canadians describe themselves as being in the “centre.”

In four Abacus Data surveys conducted from September to November, interviewing over 10,000 Canadian adults, 45 percent self-identified as being in the centre of a traditional Left-Right spectrum. Another 28 percent put themselves on the Left or centre-Left, while 27 percent said they were on the Right or centre-Right.

Given this preponderance of centrist identities, it’s tempting to imagine that most Canadians consistently occupy a stable and stationary midpoint between Left and Right, holding a set of beliefs that consistently land in the moderate zone, and that’s where politics is won or lost in Canada.

However, what voters identify as “centrist”—or what appears to be the political centre—often has less to do with an enduring ideological creed and more to do with the immediate societal circumstances they face. In other words, the political centre is not a fixed position on a spectrum, but rather a dynamic and shifting space shaped by changing conditions and priorities.

In a more recent survey I conducted, I asked Canadians 20 questions related to economic and social policies. Their responses were used to map the population onto two axes based on their economic views and their cultural or social views. The results offer a more nuanced and accurate map of the electorate’s ideological orientation.

Traditional political analysis often focuses on a single ideological dimension: Left versus Right, or progressive versus conservative. But these linear models assume that a voter who holds progressive cultural views will naturally be progressive on economic issues, or that cultural conservatism aligns neatly with free-market economics. But, real-world politics defies these neat alignments.

The two-dimensional approach I describe above recognizes that economic and cultural attitudes often vary independently of each other. For example, it is entirely possible—and not uncommon—for someone to favour strong social safety nets (an economically progressive stance), yet hold traditional or conservative views on social issues like marriage, gender roles, or national identity. Similarly, a person who supports free markets and lower taxes might also hold progressive views on issues of racial equality, gender rights, or environmental protection.

Moreover, how is it that so many of the voters within these clearly different ideological quadrants self-identify as “centrist”? Is the term “centre” not well defined? Maybe. Is it that they don’t understand the Left-Right spectrum? Probably. Or, is it that it’s easy to place yourself in the middle of something you don’t understand? Very likely.

Or is it that the centre is a moving target?

As I worked more closely with this data, I was struck by the fact that voters within these segments could shift their vote choice between two options that seem like polar opposites within a four-year period (from Justin Trudeau to Pierre Poilievre). It raised a question: could both Trudeau and Poilievre, at different times, represent the political centre in Canada?

The best of times

Consider how economic conditions influence voter behaviour. When the economy is performing well—jobs are plentiful, wages are rising, and the cost of living feels manageable—voters may have the psychological and financial “breathing room” to consider abstract policy questions, moral principles, or long-term cultural values. In these good times, debates about multiculturalism, gender equity, environmental justice, or freedom of expression might occupy a prominent spot in the public conversation. A voter who blends socially progressive views (supporting LGBTQ+ rights, welcoming immigration, advocating for inclusive policies) with fiscally moderate or even mildly conservative views might appear “centrist” in this environment. They support some state interventions but not overly large spending programs, and they endorse cultural openness without endorsing the most radical policy shifts. In a period of prosperity, this blend of positions seems comfortably moderate or centrist—neither calling for dramatic economic overhauls nor retreating into isolationism.

The worst of times

However, that same voter might respond very differently if conditions sour. Imagine that inflation spikes, housing costs soar, groceries become expensive, and economic stability feels threatened (sounds like the last two years doesn’t it?). Suddenly, their top priority may no longer be cultural inclusivity or major reform on social issues; instead, the dominant concern is immediate economic relief and trust in a party or leader to restore affordability and predictability. In bad times, material security trumps post-material expression and progress.

Under these conditions, the voter might support more forceful government interventions to control prices or provide financial relief—even if they previously preferred a lighter touch from the state. Or, they might move toward candidates who promise strong “law and order” measures if they perceive scarcity (housing, affordability…etc) as leading to social tension, or who vow to protect domestic industries if global supply chain issues drive up costs.

These voters are also likely to reject political leaders who they feel are focused on the wrong priorities. Single-use plastic bans or gendered-budgeting don’t make sense or seem important when all they want is empathy and cost of living relief to make their dollars go further than they do. Changes to the environment could make the same voter appear more interventionist (e.g., endorsing price controls, subsidies, or bailouts) or more culturally cautious (e.g., hesitant about rapidly increasing immigration during an economic crunch or perceived scarcity).

What was seen as a centrist position during good times—cautiously blending market freedoms with progressive social values—might now tilt toward what we label as economically interventionist or even conservative under stress. But, the voter hasn’t necessarily had a radical change of heart. Instead, their definition of “reasonable” or “moderate” action evolves to match the challenges at hand. Thus, a new “centre” is created.

When the public conversation centres on affordability, cost-of-living crises, or fears of economic instability, the political centre realigns around whoever can credibly promise competence and relief, regardless of ideological purity.

This fluidity reveals a fundamental truth: “the centre” in politics is not a stable, carefully balanced midpoint. It is a moving target, defined by what the majority of voters deem urgent, solvable, and credible at any given time.

In prosperous moments, cultural progressivism and expansive state intervention in the economy may sit comfortably in the middle. But in times of hardship, that same voter’s version of the centre might gravitate toward direct state action to reduce taxes or fees or more protective policies around safety and security. And they may care less about cultural progressivism. Their self-understanding as a moderate does not vanish; it simply adapts. They still consider themselves reasonable and pragmatic—but what counts as reasonable has shifted with the context.

The centre as a moving target

Consider, for example, Canadians’ attitudes toward a national carbon tax. In a period of relative economic stability and heightened concern over climate change, broad support for a carbon tax—seen as a prudent way to reduce emissions and fund green initiatives—can mark the centre of Canadian politics. Its advocates portray it as a balanced, efficient policy that most “reasonable” people should accept.

Yet, in an era of soaring energy and food prices and widespread cost-of-living fears, that previously centrist position might be turned on its head. Suddenly, scrapping the carbon tax to relieve price pressures could become a centrist position, aligning with voters’ pressing economic anxieties. Once again, what appears to be moderate, common sense policy depends not on a fixed ideological midpoint, but on the shifting terrain of public priorities and material conditions.

A similar pattern emerges with defence spending. In periods of relative peace, when the international order feels stable and Canadians perceive few direct threats, calls to boost military budgets can seem unnecessary and out of step with mainstream opinion. During such times, the centre might favour minimal increases, if any at all.

But when the geopolitical landscape grows more uncertain, wars flare abroad, or Canada’s largest trading partner presses for more equitable burden-sharing within NATO, what was once a peripheral concern can suddenly become central. Upgrading military capabilities or meeting alliance spending targets may feel not only sensible, but urgently required.

Once again, the “centre” is not a permanent fixture; the consensus shifts in tandem with how secure—or insecure—Canadian voters believe the world to be, and what they see as Canada’s role within it.

Ultimately, the political centre is situational. It is shaped by the prevailing environment, the problems voters need addressed, and their perceptions of which leaders or parties can competently address them. As national conditions change—be they economic booms, recessions, public health crises, or social upheavals—so too does the definition of centrism.

Consider these examples:

Paul Martin and Jean Chrétien (1990s-early 2000s)

By tackling the deficit while simultaneously presenting themselves as empathetic stewards of social programs, Prime Ministers Paul Martin and Jean Chrétien positioned the Liberal Party at the heart of Canadian politics. Their blend of fiscal prudence and responsiveness to public needs reflected where the majority of Canadians stood at the time.

Stephen Harper (2008-2009 financial crisis)

During the global financial downturn, former prime minister Stephen Harper’s “Economic Action Plan”—centered on strategic deficit spending and infrastructure investment—tapped into the national mood. By embracing pragmatic stimulus measures, Harper’s Conservatives occupied a centrist position that resonated broadly with Canadians worried about jobs and stability.

Justin Trudeau (Post-#MeToo era)

At the height of the #MeToo movement, Prime Minister Trudeau’s emphasis on a gender-balanced cabinet and a feminist foreign policy resonated with a public increasingly attentive to gender equality. In that cultural moment, these initiatives placed his government near the centre of Canadian public sentiment.

Justin Trudeau (COVID-19 pandemic)

In the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, Prime Minister Trudeau’s approach—support for vaccine mandates, travel restrictions, and emergency relief—aligned closely with the public’s desire for decisive action and collective protection. By reflecting mainstream health concerns, Trudeau found himself governing from the centre of Canadian public opinion.

Pierre Poilievre (our current scarcity mindset)

In a climate of rising costs and scarcity, Conservative leader Poilievre’s platform—promising relief from carbon taxes, reducing regulatory hurdles for housing, and prioritizing public safety—addresses the bread-and-butter worries of many Canadians today. His emphasis on affordability and security reflects what a significant portion of the electorate—including younger Canadians—now considers the political centre.

Central limitations

Yet we must still remember that even as the centre shifts in response to new conditions, it is never wholly unmoored from deeper cultural underpinnings. Social norms and ingrained values act as guardrails, preventing public opinion from veering too far beyond what is considered acceptable discourse. Canada’s political culture—steeped in commitments to fairness, tolerance, and democratic principles—limits how much the “centre” can move. While voters might swing from supporting to opposing a carbon tax, from resisting to embracing increased defence spending or wanting more or less attention paid to social justice and equity issues, they rarely desert the fundamental ethos that defines Canadian society. Major violations of human rights, the wholesale dismantling of social protections, or the abandonment of core democratic norms remain outside the mainstream.

Jared Wesley, a political scientist at the University of Alberta, has examined the role of political culture in shaping the ideological landscape. His work shows that while short-term events, economic shocks, or security fears can push the midpoint of public opinion in new directions, political culture sets the broader parameters. These cultural boundaries serve as a framework within which opinion oscillates. They ensure that even when preferences move in response to inflation, scarcity, or international pressures, the defining features of Canada’s political identity—moderation, civility, and respect for the common good—still guide the conversation.

In this sense, the “centre” is best understood not as a single point on a line or a moment in time, but as a dynamic range constantly adjusting within those stable cultural confines. Canadians may disagree on the best ways to tackle climate change, set defence spending targets, or manage social programs, but the debate unfolds within a recognizable set of values. These enduring norms, documented and analyzed by scholars like Wesley, create a kind of ideological shoreline. The tide of public opinion may rise and fall, shifting the centre here or there, but it rarely washes entirely past these cultural boundaries.

Is there a centre in Canadian politics? Yes, but it is not the fixed midpoint many imagine that most Canadians always occupy and that no party today seems to be able to hit.

Instead, the centre is a fluid and ever-evolving point, shaped not by a static position between Left and Right, but by a shifting context and environment. It is a dynamic space where events shape the spectrum, leaders set the agenda, and the public rallies around a collective problem and solution. It means that within a decade, both Trudeau and Poilievre can be the “centres” of Canadian politics. If the centre of Canadian politics is what some believe it is, Jean Charest would be Conservative leader and Christie Clarke would be the front runner to be the next Liberal leader. But the centre is not where most people are all the time. It’s where circumstance and issue focus puts them at any given point in time.