Canada’s parliamentary system is at a crossroads. Over the past several decades, power has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of party leaders—particularly the prime minister—at the expense of elected Members of Parliament (MPs) and, by extension, the constituents they represent. This centralization of authority undermines the very foundations of our democracy. If we are serious about restoring accountability and strengthening our institutions, we must take concrete steps to rebalance power within Parliament.
The issue is not merely procedural; it is profoundly democratic. In Canada, citizens elect local MPs—not prime ministers, senators, or judges. This is their only federal vote. The House of Commons is meant to be the people’s chamber, where representatives debate, scrutinize legislation, and hold the government to account. Yet, over time, MPs have been sidelined by a system that prioritizes party discipline over independent judgment. The result? A Parliament that too often functions as a rubber stamp rather than a robust check on executive power.
This erosion of parliamentary independence did not happen overnight. It is the product of incremental changes—many of them procedural—that have shifted authority away from individual MPs and into the hands of party leadership. One of the most glaring examples is the “list system,” which dictates who gets to speak in the House. Instead of the speaker recognizing members based on their presence and willingness to participate, MPs must now secure a spot on a party-controlled list.
This system turns the speaker into little more than a “bingo caller,” reading names from a pre-approved script. The consequences are stark: MPs who dissent or challenge their party’s leadership risk being silenced, while those who toe the line are rewarded with speaking opportunities. The recent crises in leadership in Ottawa—marked by prolonged infighting over many months, paralysis and the prorogation of Parliament—highlights the dangers of a system that concentrates too much power in too few hands.
The problem extends beyond the chamber itself. Parliamentary committees, where the bulk of legislative scrutiny and policy study takes place, have also fallen under the grip of party leaders. Committee members and chairs are typically appointed by party whips—often at the direction of the Prime Minister’s Office—rather than elected by their peers. This creates a culture of deference, where MPs fear repercussions if they deviate from the party line. The solution? Adopting a secret ballot system for selecting committee members and chairs, as the United Kingdom did over a decade ago. This reform would empower MPs to act independently, free from the pressure of party leadership, and restore committees as true forums for accountability.
Then there is the Board of Internal Economy (BOIE), the powerful body that oversees the administration of the House of Commons and its more than half-billion-dollar budget. Like committees, the BOIE is dominated by appointments controlled by party leaders, particularly the PMO. This arrangement blurs the line between the legislative and executive branches, giving the government undue influence over the very institution meant to hold it accountable. Reforming the BOIE to include a majority of backbench MPs, elected by secret ballot, would help reclaim Parliament’s independence.
These reforms are not radical; they are practical, achievable, and grounded in precedent. The Reform Act, which I introduced nearly a decade ago, was a modest step in this direction. Though watered down from its original form, the legislation has gradually shifted the culture within Parliament, giving caucuses more control over their own affairs. Its success proves that change is possible—but there is much more to be done.
The stakes could not be higher. A Parliament that lacks independence cannot effectively scrutinize legislation, challenge government overreach, or represent the diverse voices of Canadians. When MPs are reduced to mere extensions of their party’s leadership, democracy suffers. The recent crises in leadership across Canadian political parties highlight the dangers of a system that concentrates too much power in too few hands.
Some may argue that strong party discipline is necessary for stability and efficiency. But efficiency at the expense of accountability is a false bargain. A healthy democracy requires robust debate, dissent, and deliberation—not just streamlined decision-making. The reforms I propose would not weaken parties; they would strengthen Parliament by ensuring that MPs can truly serve the people who elected them.
The time for action is now. As a new parliamentary session begins, we have an opportunity to restore balance to our system. By abolishing the party list system, adopting secret ballots for committees, and reforming the BOIE, we can reclaim Parliament as the people’s institution. These changes are not about partisan advantage; they are about safeguarding the principles of representative democracy.
Generative AI assisted in the production of this article, based on an interview done on The Hub’s YouTube channel.
