David Coletto: Four myths (and one truth) about the 2025 federal election

Elections are messy, emotional, and complex, and the 2025 Canadian federal election was no exception. In the weeks since the results came in, I’ve consumed a lot of commentary, analysis, and hot takes from journalists, pundits, campaign operatives, and academics. Some of it matches what I saw in the data. But a lot of it doesn’t.

Since early March, Abacus Data has conducted eight national surveys, interviewing over 20,000 Canadians. We also fielded a comprehensive post-election survey with 1,500 eligible voters in the days immediately following election day. These polls give us a uniquely detailed picture of what happened. And not just how people voted, but why.

So, I thought it was worth setting the record straight on five of the most common myths or perspectives I’ve heard about the 2025 election. Some of these myths contain a grain of truth. But most oversimplify what was a complicated election shaped by two dominant forces: a desire for change at home and anxiety about what’s happening south of our borders.

Here are five myths about the 2025 election and what the data actually tells us.

1. The 2025 election was all about Trump

This one’s only half true.

There’s no doubt that President Donald Trump’s re-election campaign and the threat of his return to the White House loomed large in the minds of many Canadians. But it wasn’t the sole or even dominant force shaping vote choice.

Our post-election survey found that roughly half of the electorate—45 percent—said their primary factor in their vote was about the party best able to handle Trump, rather than the party that could deliver change. About four in 10 Canadians rated it as one of their top three issues, and when asked which issue was most important, 21 percent said it was Trump and his administration. It was important, but it wasn’t the only issue, as domestic concerns about affordability, the economy, housing, and health care were also high on the issue list.

What made this election unique was how these forces interacted. For many voters on the centre-left, the idea of a Pierre Poilievre-led Canada in a Trump-led world felt too risky. That gave Prime Minister Mark Carney and the Liberals an opening to frame themselves as a bulwark against instability. For others, the argument that “it’s time for a change” was more persuasive, and affordability issues trumped concerns about geopolitics.

So no, it wasn’t all about Trump. But he shaped the context in which the Liberals survived.

2. Poilievre has a woman problem

Yes—but let’s be precise. Conservatives have had a “woman problem” for a while now, if not for a long time.

It’s true that Poilievre was less popular among women than men throughout the campaign. Our polling consistently found a gender gap of 6 to 10 percent in favourable views. In our final poll, the gap was 6 percent; 45 percent of men had a positive impression of Poilievre, compared with 39 percent of women.

But this is not a new phenomenon for Conservatives. Stephen Harper, Andrew Scheer, and Erin O’Toole all faced similar gender gaps. In fact, Poilievre performed better than all three of those leaders at the end of the last three election campaigns. In 2025, Poilievre’s net favourable score in our post-election survey among women was -6. It was -18 for O’Toole in 2021, -21 for Scheer in 2019, and -35 for Harper in 2015.

So while the “woman problem” narrative isn’t entirely wrong, it’s more accurate to say that Poilievre didn’t overcome the structural challenges Conservatives have long faced among women, especially urban, Gen Z, Boomer, and university-educated women. That’s different than saying he uniquely repelled them.

3. Poilievre was deeply unpopular

This one is just wrong.

Poilievre ended the campaign with a net personal favourability rating of +2, better than any Conservative leader since Harper in 2011. Compared to Scheer in 2019 (-17) or O’Toole in 2021(-8), Poilievre was not only more well-known and better defined, but more Canadians liked him than any previous Conservative leader.

But here’s the rub: he was up against someone even more popular. When Justin Trudeau announced he was leaving office, Carney wasn’t well known, but in short order, he became the most positively viewed political leader in the country, generating positive impressions we have not seen since 2015. Carney also consistently outperformed Poilievre in leadership attributes such as trustworthiness, competence, and experience.

In other words, Poilievre wasn’t necessarily disliked; he was simply less liked than his opponent. And in a campaign where trust and risk were key themes, that made all the difference.

4. The NDP is dead

The NDP suffered a catastrophic election. But they’re not dead.

Yes, their vote share fell to its lowest level since the 1993 election. Yes, they lost dozens of seats.

But in our post-election survey, 10 percent of Canadians identified as New Democrats. Now, that’s substantially lower than the 36 percent who identify as Conservative and 31 percent who identify as Liberal. And more troubling, less than half of those who self-identify as New Democrats voted NDP in the 2025 election. Fifty-one percent voted Liberal and 5 percent voted Conservative. Thirty-eight percent of Canadians still say they are open to voting for the NDP.

So the optimistic view of all of this is that with the right leader, the party can fairly quickly rebuild some of its coalition, and its brand still has value. But it also signals a crisis of relevance. The NDP failed to give its base a compelling reason to stick with them. Strategic voting, especially in close Liberal-Conservative races, cost them dearly. And in an environment where fear of Trump and Poilievre loomed large, many progressives made a pragmatic choice.

The NDP’s challenge now is to rebuild trust, reconnect with its core voters, and find a distinct identity.

5. Baby Boomers saved the Liberals

Ok, this one is actually true, and it’s the most underappreciated story of the 2025 election.

Compared to 2021, the Liberals made their biggest gains among voters over 60. In our post-election poll, the Liberals won those 60-plus by 11 percent over the Conservatives. From 2021, there was a 19-point increase in vote share for the Liberals and an 8-point drop for the Conservatives. It was the only age group in which the Conservatives lost vote share compared to the previous election, even as the NDP vote collapsed across all age groups.

Most striking was the shift among men over 60. In 2021, the Conservatives won men over 60 by 26 percent. In 2025, they lost them by 6 percent to the Liberals.

Why the shift? Part of it was the Carney effect: older voters viewed him as competent, steady, and safe. Part of it was fear: Boomers were more likely to say Trump was a major factor in their vote, and they overwhelmingly thought Carney was better able to handle him.

And let’s not forget turnout. Older Canadians are far more likely to vote, and this cycle was no different. The Liberal campaign did a good job of reminding older voters what was at stake—and it paid off.

So what?

Elections produce narratives. And in the rush to explain outcomes, we often reach for simple stories. But politics is rarely simple.

The 2025 election wasn’t a referendum on one leader, one issue, or one ideology. It was a multi-dimensional contest shaped by fear, hope, economic anxiety, and geopolitical uncertainty.

Poilievre didn’t lose because he was hated. He lost because enough Canadians trusted someone else more. The Liberals didn’t win because their base held strong. They won because they expanded it, particularly among older voters. And while the NDP collapsed, its voters didn’t disappear. They drifted and could come back.

As the dust settles, the myths will harden. But the data tells a richer, more complex story. It’s one worth listening to.