Trump’s new national security strategy predicts ‘three bully world’ that brings back 19th-century spheres of influence, expert warns

The Trump administration’s newly released national security strategy has sent shockwaves through diplomatic circles, particularly in Canada and Europe, with its bold reassertion of American dominance over the Western hemisphere. The document, which departs dramatically from traditional national security strategies in both tone and substance, has raised urgent questions about the future of Canada-U.S. relations and the international rules-based order. The strategy invokes the Monroe Doctrine—a 202-year-old policy warning European and other global powers to stay away from the Americas—but extends it in ways that have profound implications for Canadian sovereignty, particularly regarding foreign investment and control of Arctic waterways. Hub co-founder Rudyard Griffiths spoke with Janice Gross Stein, a leading expert on international relations and founding director of the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the University of Toronto, to better understand the document’s significance and what it means for Canada. Here are five key takeaways from the conversation: This is not a typical national security strategy: Unlike previous administrations’ carefully crafted documents written by committees of senior bureaucrats, this strategy is short, dramatic, and reads as though written by a small group speaking bluntly about their worldview. The “Trump Corollary” expands the Monroe Doctrine to include Canada: While the original 1823 Monroe Doctrine warned European powers that Latin America fell within the United States’ sphere of influence, the new strategy explicitly extends American claims across the entire North-Western hemisphere, including Canada. The phrase wording around no foreign assets could have chilling implications: The strategy’s language about prohibiting foreign ownership of key assets in the hemisphere raises questions about everything from European co-production agreements to technology stocks in Canada. Canada’s Arctic sovereignty is directly challenged: The document’s insistence on “preserving freedom of navigation in all crucial sea lanes” represents a deliberate assertion that places like the Northwest Passage are an international waterway, not Canadian internal waters, using language similar to Trump’s rhetoric about the Panama Canal. We’re entering a “three bully world”: The strategy envisions a return to 19th-century spheres of influence, with the United States, China, and Russia each dominating their respective regions, while smaller nations become mere “rule takers.” An unprecedented departure from diplomatic norms The document represents a stark break from how American administrations typically present their national security priorities. “This is a short, dramatic national security strategy that looks like it was written by five people who told it like they see it,” Stein explained. “This has set Europe on fire. Some people are saying this is the end of Europe’s traditional relationship with the United States.” Traditional national security strategies are carefully calibrated documents, with “every word measured” and “fought over internally” by senior bureaucrats, said Stein. But this one dispenses with diplomatic niceties in favour of blunt assertions of American power and interests. From Monroe to Trump: A doctrine reimagined The strategy’s invocation of the Monroe Doctrine carries particular historical weight. As Stein noted, U.S. President James Monroe issued his doctrine in 1823 to warn European imperial powers—Spain, Portugal, and others looking towards Latin America—to “back off. This is our backyard. This is our neighbourhood.” The doctrine was reinforced in 1904 with the Roosevelt Corollary, as Latin American countries gained independence. “Now in 2025, we get the Trump corollary, and it reads very differently,” Stein said. “It says yes, again, the whole hemisphere in South America, Latin America, but including Canada, by implication, is our backyard. We are the dominant power.” “Then there’s a chilling phrase in there which I thought about over and over again,” Stein continued. “And it says not only [will there be] no foreign interference, but [also] no foreign assets in this hemisphere. Just think what that might mean for Canada if the Trump administration means that literally.” Arctic water access The strategy’s language about the access represents a particularly direct challenge to Canadian sovereignty, said Stein. The strategy expands the scope to explicitly include preventing “non-Hemispheric competitors” from controlling “strategically vital assets” and, crucially, ensuring America’s “continued access to key strategic locations.” The document also discusses “preserving freedom of navigation in all crucial sea lanes.” Canada has long maintained that places like the Northwest Passage are an internal waterway. But the U.S. has never recognized this claim, insisting it is instead an international waterway. “Trump used that word ‘access’ very deliberately,” Stein observed. “That is an assertion that the Northwest Passage is an international waterway and goes further than simply saying it insists on access to that waterway, in language that strikes me as not very different from the way the Trump administration has talked about the Panama Canal.” Historically, relations between Canada and the U.S. around the passage have been amicable. They typically “just agree to differ” on this longstanding dispute. But this explicit assertion in a national security strategy document signals a more confrontational approach. Defining “foreign assets” in the hemisphere The prohibition on foreign ownership of key assets raises numerous practical questions for Canadian policymakers. “We want a Hemisphere that remains free of hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets,” Trump’s latest national security strategy states. “Does that mean, for example, that you can’t have co-production agreements with Europeans? Just to take one example of fighter aircraft,” Stein asked. “There’s no specifics here, but these are very bold, very broad claims that I think Canadian policymakers should take seriously.” The lack of specificity makes the language particularly concerning, explained Stein, as it leaves open a wide range of potential interpretations that could affect everything from defence cooperation to technology investment. A return to spheres of influence Perhaps most fundamentally, Stein argues the strategy represents a wholesale rejection of the post-Second World War international order in favour of a 19th-century model of great power competition. In this strategy’s vision, “there’s the United States, that owns the whole of the Northern and Southern hemisphere in the West, there’s China, that is dominant in Asia. And…Russia is dominant in Eurasia.” Stein describes this framework as “the three bully world”—where “these three big powers can bully their near neighbours. They can make the rules. The rest of us are just rule takers.” “Forget about international law or any kind of rules-based order,” Stein concluded. “That’s gone, folks. We’re back to where we were in the 19th century and just get used to it, because that’s the world we’re going into as far as this national security doctrine is concerned.” This commentary draws on a Hub podcast. It was edited using AI. Full program here.