Canada needs an effective fighting force, not another boondoggle

Furthermore, the second line almost always produces fewer copies as well, which further increases costs. Generally, the actual amount of production is fairly limited—usually entailing the assembly of major final assemblies, like with Brazil which assembles Gripens for its airforce and only employs several hundred workers, not ten thousand, employed. In order to obtain more industrial opportunities (read: jobs), greater domestic component substitution is required, which only increases the cost further. The most likely scenario with the Gripen is that Canada would invest hundreds of millions to open a factory in Canada, only produce seventy aircraft, (those for the RCAF), and then shortly thereafter close the factory due to low foreign demand, a crowded marketplace, and the high production costs of a licensed copy. The promise of Ukraine potentially acquiring Canadian Gripens makes little sense given the post-war economic reckoning facing that country or that a Canadian-produced Gripen would almost certainly cost more than a more capable Rafale or F-16. This alone will ensure that license production of the Gripen will become a boondoggle that will be forever associated with the government if it follows this path, like Chretien’s cancellation of the EH-101 helicopter that required the decrepit Sea King helicopter to keep operating for another 20 years. Nor would choosing the Gripen stimulate long-term industrial development, even with technology transfer. Bottom line, the reality is that this approach invariably licenses an older, established design, which utilizes yesterdays’ technology: it fails make domestic firms competitive against foreign competitors working on cutting-edge systems. It also doesn’t provide the experiential knowledge required to use the intellectual property effectively, which would be particularly important if Ottawa views the purchase as a stepping stone towards a more self-sufficient domestic fighter industry. In Canada’s case, the structure of the country’s aerospace industry, the limited number of aircraft acquired by the country, and the requirement to maintain high levels of interoperability with allied countries’ air forces severely limit any potential advantages of this approach. An alternative approach Instead, Canada should look to its participation in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program as a model for future aerospace industrial development. Certainly, the joint development approach has become extremely popular among Western states as a means of sharing development costs and increasing production size. To maximize the potential benefits of joint development, Ottawa will need to shift its procurement practices to eschew competition and take the risk of joining a program early on during its development. If Canada selects an aircraft after a design is chosen and engineering and production development have started, it is already too late. Establishing an industrial supply chain occurs early in a program’s life, as the prime contractor works with subcomponent manufacturers to refine its engineering. The government has already laid the potential groundwork for this approach by expanding the national security exemption’s utility in the spring of 2025, which limits other firms’ ability to protest procurement decisions. Getting the right model for developing the defence aerospace sector is critical, given the strategic situation Canada finds itself in. Considering the vast continental landmass it must defend, as well as the need to deploy abroad to support the country’s allies, the RCAF is primed to receive a large portion of the new defence spending increase. There is also a pressing need to ensure that the CAF has a secure and sustainable supply of defence material that can be mobilized during a potential war. The defence industrial policies established today will form the foundation for a massive expansion if or when that is required. There are already several opportunities available to the government. Even though the RCAF has not even taken delivery of its first replacement for the CF-18 fighter jet, the decade-long delay in that process and the rapidly advancing state of technology require DND to start considering now the next generation of airpower capabilities, either to augment the fighter jets it receives or replace them outright in two decades’ time. The core capabilities are likely to be provided by one of the several ongoing “sixth-generation” aircraft programs. Joining one was a policy promise from the Liberal Party during the last election. Of the potential options, potentially only the U.K.-led Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) or the American F/A-XX offer the right mix of interoperability, military capabilities, and industrial opportunities for Canadian firms. And given the current interest in diversifying the country’s supplier base outside the U.S., the logical and politically viable choice is the GCAP. Again, if Ottawa wants to extract maximum benefit from selecting the GCAP for the RCAF, its window of opportunity to join and invest in the program is closing rapidly. Let’s look to the future—now In addition to sixth-generation aircraft, other opportunities exist in defence aerospace, which Ottawa should be keen to exploit. Much like in the 1940s and ‘50s with the development of jet engines, electronics, and exotic materials, Canadian industry now faces a dramatically shifting technological and doctrinal environment in airpower that is opening up new operational and industrial opportunities. The emerging airpower doctrine will require a family of manned and unmanned platforms operating in a distributed, networked system to achieve aerial superiority. Leading the way are a new class of unmanned vehicles that are to operate alongside manned capabilities—commonly known as Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs). These vary in size and cost, from a thousand-pound disposable delivery system that could cost a few million dollars to a fighter-sized “loyal wingman” that may cost around $40-60 million per unit. Australia, for instance, has forged ahead on this path, supporting the development of the MQ-28 Ghostbat, which may be adopted by the United States Air Force and Navy for their service. The novelty of this area and its growth opportunities offer multiple opportunities for Canadian firms, particularly at the lower end of that spectrum. Since many of these systems may look similar to existing long-range missiles, and should be considered “munitions” as they are rapidly expended during a conflict, the need for a large production capacity will be required. Canada could also invest in larger UAV capabilities that would be useful for patrolling in the Arctic or the country’s coastlines. This may involve developing aircraft like the Bombardier Global 6500 into an unmanned sensor platform that can loiter for long periods with a large radar array that works in conjunction with manned platforms. However, the bottom line is that the only way to achieve these more forward-looking capabilities is to develop a nimble defence industrial strategy that is closely married to the RCAF’s requirements and the prevailing technological environment. This is not a new suggestion: the 2013 report on defence procurement led by industry executive Tom Jenkins made that one of its primary recommendations. A return to licensed production as opposed to participation in joint programs (like the JSF and beyond) would severely undermine Canada’s defence industrial strategy and our capacity to properly equip the RCAF in both the long and short term. Failure to do so will ensure that the influx of new spending is poorly rationalized and limit the military’s ability to actually provide for the defence and security of this country. After three decades of neglect, the armed forces and the country deserve better.