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Trevor Tombe: What increased military spending may mean for Canada’s budget


Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has upended the geopolitical landscape for many countries, including Canada. 

It has also reinforced the value of NATO and the importance of ensuring the armed forces of these allied countries are well resourced—with a target agreed to in the 2014 “Defence Investment Pledge” for each country to spend at least 2 percent of GDP by 2024.“All 30 Allies contribute to the NATO budget on an agreed cost-share formula based on Gross National Income, which represents a small percentage of each member’s defence budget. This is the principle of common funding, and demonstrates burden-sharing in action.”

Currently, many countries fall short. Canada ranks 25th out of 30.

This may soon change. At the March 24 meeting of NATO Heads of State and Government, the allies all agreed “to accelerate our efforts to fulfil our commitment to the Defence Investment Pledge in its entirety”.

Several countries have already committed to increases. Poland will increase military spending to 3 percent of its GDP, Romania to 2.5 percent, Germany to more than 2 percent, and Italy, Spain, Denmark, and potentially the Netherlands to 2 percent. The Slovak Republic not only agrees but goes further to say 2 percent should be the base, rather than the target. The commitments of these eight countries are equivalent to 0.6 percentage points of their overall GDP—similar to what Canada needs to also achieve the target.

Before going further, let me be perfectly clear: I’m an economist, not a defence policy expert. I don’t know what the optimal level of military spending is or how it should be allocated. I also don’t know whether Canada’s problematic procurement systems can effectively absorb such an increase

Instead, my aim is to map out the fiscal choices available to fund Canada’s increases. And as I’ll show below, there are many reasonable options.

The fiscal context

Canada has already increased military spending from one percent of GDP in 2014, when the NATO Pledge was made, to 1.4 percent in 2021. And current policy under the Defence Investment Plan is set to increase this further, potentially reaching 1.5 percent by 2024 but declining slightly thereafter. 

Achieving a 2 percent of GDP spending level by 2024, therefore, represents an increase of 0.5 percentage points of GDP above the current policy. This would mean a military budget of $58 billion by 2024—nearly 70 percent higher than was spent in 2021. 

I’m going to go out on a limb and suggest this may be infeasible (or at least unwise), given the challenges of procurement, recruitment, etc. Increasing to 1.5 percent in 2023 and by 0.1 percentage points annually thereafter might be more reasonable. This would lead to a 2 percent military spending level by 2028 and is consistent with a recommendation made in a 2017 Senate of Canada report suggesting this be the target.“The Committee is convinced that Canada must increase defence spending to 2% of GDP starting in 2018 and continue increasing spending by 0.1% of GDP each year until 2028. To see how we get there, please refer to the table on Page 18. This proposal will reverse the decline in spending and will put the military on a course to be able to fulfil the stated government requirement to simultaneously meet Canada’s obligations to NORAD and NATO, as well as to providing the necessary security for our own citizens.”

Whatever the pace of growth, important fiscal choices are required to support it.

Lower other spending

Increasing defence spending could be offset by decreasing spending elsewhere.

For perspective, meeting the 2 percent target is equivalent to an across the board 10 percent reduction in direct federal operating expenses—returning such spending to its 2016-17 level. Lowering transfers to provinces by roughly 15 percent could also create the necessary room.

But sudden reductions in any area are not necessary. 

If the increase in military spending is phased in by 2028, then other federal spending could still increase—just at a slower rate. I estimate program spending (excluding the incremental boost to military spending) could grow over the five years from 2023 to 2028 by an average of 1.8 percent per year to accommodate reaching the 2 percent target.

One option could do much of the heavy lifting: make elderly benefits less generous.

As Canada’s population ages, spending on elderly benefits is set to rise dramatically. Indeed, the increase in military spending required to reach the 2 percent target is less than the projected increase in OAS and GIS payments by 2030.

Re-establishing the previously planned increase in the age of OAS eligibility to 67 (over the period 2023 to 2029), which was cancelled in 2016, would fund roughly half of the military spending increase. And reversing recent increases to OAS could be worth another 0.12 percentage points of GDP

There are obvious political challenges with this, and one can certainly disagree with its merits. But as our population ages, it’s a conversation we shouldn’t shy away from.“We propose that legislators defer the target eligibility age for full benefits under the CPP/QPP from 65 to 67 while at the same time deferring the minimum early retirement age to 62 and the maximum postponed retirement age to 75. We are seeing increased participation rates at older ages in the working population and this trend is projected to increase over the years.”

Raise taxes

We could also increase government revenue. There are countless options here. 

Returning the GST to 7 percent, for example, increases revenues by roughly two-thirds of a percent of GDP—more than enough to cover the military spending increase.

Alternatively, we could increase marginal personal income tax rates by roughly 1.5 percentage points across all tax brackets. Importantly, increasing rates on only the highest-income Canadians wouldn’t get you very far. Each percentage-point increase in the top tax rate, for example, may yield roughly $370 million per year. And increasing the corporate tax rate dramatically to 20 percent might get you halfway to the target.

A sensible route might be to modestly increase several tax rates and fees. For perspective, reaching the 2 percent target by 2028 could be covered by increasing total federal tax revenues by approximately 5 percent across the board.

Combined with modest spending growth restraint, revenue increases could be even less.

Borrow the money

A third option requires neither (current) tax increases nor spending reductions: borrow the money.

This may sound irresponsible (and there are certainly tradeoffs to this option, and I’m not personally a fan) but it’s a feasible option. The federal government’s long-run fiscal capacity is large. A declining debt-to-GDP ratio is a strong indicator of long-run fiscal sustainability, and the federal debt ratio is set to decline consistently in the coming years. 

Using the PBO’s latest Economic and Fiscal Outlook, I estimate that the federal government has room to increase spending by approximately 1 percent of GDP while maintaining its current net-debt-to-GDP ratio. And over a longer-term horizon, as illustrated by the Finances of the Nation’s Debt Sustainability Simulator, it has even more room to manoeuvre. 

This is a risky option, to be clear. Adverse moves in future interest rates or economic growth would be more difficult to manage. It also erodes the fiscal room that may be required to assist provincial governments facing unsustainable finances. But it is a feasible option that, at the very least, may be required in the short term.

A budget to watch

This is anything but an exhaustive list of options available to boost Canada’s military spending. But it hopefully illustrates that accommodating increased military spending, even relatively rapid increases, is entirely manageable from a narrow fiscal perspective. 

Pressure to increase military spending is mounting. The NATO Secretary General recently called on Canada to do just that. And former Deputy Prime Minister and current Conservative Party leadership candidate Jean Charest made a strong case in an article for The Line. The government’s own defence minister, Anita Anand, is currently exploring “aggressive” options but will need support in Cabinet to move any plan forward.

Polling suggests Canadians may “marginally favour” increased defence spending, though there is little agreement on how best to fund it. Luckily, there are many options.“The latest national public opinion poll from Nanos Research, commissioned by CTV News and The Globe and Mail, reports that 19 per cent of respondents support and 28 per cent somewhat support the move. However, polling showed 31 per cent of those surveyed oppose raising taxes for defence spending while 17 per cent somewhat oppose it.”

The upcoming federal budget may provide an indication of what the government has in mind. For this and so many other reasons, it will be an important budget to watch.

Patrick Luciani: To understand Putin, look to the history of tyrants


In 1998, I happened to be in Moscow during a national holiday commemorating the armed forces. I watched the public strolling and paying tribute to past Soviet Secretary Generals buried in the Kremlin. Two vivid memories have stayed with me over the years; first, the overwhelming number of carnations placed on the grave of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin—still number one in Russian hearts. The second was the eagerness of my guide, a retired Russian officer—whose father was a WWII war hero buried in the famous Novodevichy cemetery—to inform me, unbidden, that Stalin’s Jewish doctors had killed him.“During the Soviet Union, burial in the Novodevichy Cemetery was second in prestige only to burial in the Kremlin Wall Necropolis. Among the Soviet leaders, only Nikita Khrushchev was buried at the Novodevichy rather than at Red Square. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin Wall is no longer used for burials and the Novodevichy Cemetery is used for only the most symbolically significant burials.”

This came to mind last week when Putin lectured a massive crowd of 200,000 in Moscow to shore up support for a war he unleashed on Ukraine without permission of the Russian people, most of whom knew little of the invasion. Now that the war is going badly, he needs their approval before the sanctions do maximum damage to Russia’s economy. But the main reason is that he may need access to their dwindling savings and fresh military recruits, should it come to that, by whipping up nationalist passions. His invocation of Stalin at the rally was the place to start. Calling those who disagreed with the war scum and traitors was also a nice touch.“‘The West will try to rely on the so-called fifth column, on national traitors, on those who earn money here with us but live there. And I mean “live there” not even in the geographical sense of the word, but according to their thoughts, their slavish consciousness,’ Putin said. The ‘fifth column’ usually refers to sympathizers of the enemy during a war.”

As a tyrant, Putin has had the good fortune of not needing the support of his people for the simple reason that he had ready access to money by digging it out of the ground and stealing the nation’s wealth—oil, gas, and minerals—and selling it around the world. As long as there was plenty of money for his police, secret service, army, politicians, and oligarchs to keep him in power, the people were left to shop and eat at McDonald’s. All is changing rapidly. When passions need to be aroused, nationalism is the siren call with memories of Stalin and the perennial enemy, the Jews. This time, the Jew is replaced by America and the Nazi-fascist government in Ukraine. However, the antisemitism of Putin is just below the service when he refers to enemies as cosmopolitans, liberals, and secularists.

Despite what many in the West believe, Putin was never about the money; with the power of an autocrat, he always had access to the nation’s wealth, even that of his oligarchs. Vladimir Putin sees himself as Russia’s saviour; he is burning with anger and righteousness to make the West pay for his country’s humiliation, real or imagined. All this is captured brilliantly by Waller R. Newell, professor of political theory at Carleton University, in his book Tyrants: Power, Injustice, and Terror. Though the book only deals marginally with Putin, it takes the reader through 2500 years of tyrannical rule. One review states, “this is the biography of tyranny we’ve been waiting for.” Understand tyrants through history, and you begin to understand Putin today.

For those who believe that Putin is a throwback to some figure out of the19th century, Newell puts that illusion quickly to rest. Putin’s imperial aggression is from every century and no different from those of Robespierre, Pol Pot, or Stalin in his desire to achieve a millenarian vision of the future. For Putin, it’s a world free of liberal democracies brought low and replaced by authoritarian or totalitarian states suppressing the decadence of Western liberal niceties of free thought and the supremacy of the individual.

Still, it is hard to conceive that someone like Putin wants to destroy a world order that—despite the corruption of his country—was finally bringing some sense of prosperity to Russia, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet he chose to shock the world, bringing international condemnation and opprobrium down on himself and his people. For an answer, we have to take the influence of Putin’s close advisor Alexsandr Dugin seriously. Dugin is a Rasputin figure with a deep hatred of the West, always whispering in Putin’s ear that Russia can regain its greatness only by recreating the Soviet Empire and “when the war is ultimately carried to the primary enemy,” contending with the United States.“Dugin’s relationship with Putin and his inner circles has changed over time. Its extent is contested. Certainly, both men came to maturity within the former Soviet Russia. Both men were shocked at the regime’s collapse. Both rued Russia’s ensuing fall from superpower status. Both men are now committed to ‘making Russia great again’. Dugin thus came out publicly in favour of Putin’s controversial 2008 invasion of Georgia. During the 2014 Russia-Ukraine conflict, he bullishly called for the annexation of all Ukrainian lands that were part of the former Russian Empire.”

None of this was a secret. For years Putin has told the world that Russia is part of Eurasia and not the West and that it was just a matter of time before he would try to reclaim the territory lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union.“Vladimir Putin’s dream of a Eurasian Union, a vast trade and political bloc stretching from China to the edge of the EU, began taking shape in 2010 with the ECU, a free-trade customs union binding Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus.” Others blame the expansion of NATO and the United States for the war in Ukraine. Still, as Professor Steven Kotkin of Stanford University argued, it is hard to believe that Putin would’ve acted differently with a more compliant and less expansionist NATO. It was the former Soviet states that rushed toward NATO after the failure of communism, not the other way around. To understand tyrants like Putin, we must study their place in history. Newell’s book is an excellent place to start.