Enjoying The Hub?
Sign up for our free newsletter!

Alister Campbell: What Pierre Poilievre can learn from Mike Harris’ Common Sense Revolution

Commentary

Conservative Party Leader Pierre Poilievre speaks on Parliament Hill in Ottawa, Aug. 28, 2024. Patrick Doyle/The Canadian Press.

The federal election scheduled for next year presents Pierre Poilievre and the Conservative Party with two distinct but interconnected opportunities. The first is a political opportunity to redefine the centre in Canadian politics. The second, a policy opportunity to implement transformational and lasting change in Ottawathe change required to actually fix a “broken” Canada. 

The list of Canadian conservatives who have been able to successfully seize such opportunities is short. It does include one name with particular relevance to the present time: former Ontario Premier Mike Harris. Harris created the original “common sense” brand, and it helped him achieve back-to-back landslide majorities and enabled a series of fundamental alterations to the policy status quo in Ontarioalterations that proved both consequential and long-lasting.

In this two-part essay, Alister Campbell (“message guy” in the Harris “Common Sense Revolution” campaign of 1995 and editor of The Harris Legacy) outlines key lessons the Poilievre team must learn from the Harris story. Here’s part one. 

“We were raised on the faith
The center’s holding
And can’t be broken
And now that it’s started
It might not stop”

The Garden” by Dinosaur Jr.

Maybe only a few Hub readers listen to Dinosaur Jr. (a grunge-era band led by guitar god J. Mascis), but I suspect many more share their worry about the degree of polarization in the political discourse of the Western world these days.

To some extent it can be argued that this uncomfortably high degree of recent tensions is actually normal. It may be that the benign post-Second World War-era of Western hegemony and the broad-based consensus on general political themes (including collective security, liberalized trade, progressive taxation to fund government programs for the less fortunate, etc.) is actually the outlier and bitter conflict is the norm. Certainly, the authoritarians of the world (Putin, Xi, Khameini, Kim, etc.) are united in their view that a world of successful democratic capitalism is not for them and they would prefer a return to Cold War conflict (or worse).

But for the multiple generations of Canadians (and subscribers to The Hub) who have lived, worked, and raised their families in this prosperous G7 country—never having had to serve in a military at war—it is hard to argue with the benefits of a more consensus-based polity. In many ways, a country with a centrist majority carefully skirting the extremes at both ends of the spectrum has proven to be a pretty good deal.

For conservatives in Canada however, this deal has always required an uncomfortable amount of compromise. Over decades. Political historians would probably differ on details, but sometime around the time(s) of Prime Minister Mackenzie King, the federal Liberal Party evolved into “Canada’s natural governing party.” Carefully fencing off their more socialistically-inclined activists in a separate New Democratic Party (who fenced off their own Communists), they have been able to position themselves at the centre of our politics for the many decades since. And using the NDP as a lever, they have also been able to consistently force Canada to embrace regular and climbing increments of increased government spending and state intervention.

When the Conservatives resist, they are painted (all too often successfully) as “extremists” and “outside the mainstream.” And when so painted, they are then regularly defeated by either Liberal majorities or Liberal minorities collaborating with the NDP as joint custodians of a centre-left status quo.

Two separate streams of conservative activism rebelled against this seemingly permanent role as Canada’s “natural official Opposition party” in the course of the 1980s. One stream came from the party and expressed itself in the triumphant, landslide 1984 election victory of Brian Mulroney. While still embracing the traditions of “progressive conservatism,” Mulroney refused to accept the electoral status quo, and by breaching the Liberal fortress in Quebec, delivered two consecutive majorities to the party.

The second stream (ironically) chose this same period to declare its unwillingness to be bound by the old deal at all. Preston Manning led a rising tide of populist discomfort with the centrist status quo and accomplished something almost as extraordinary as Mulroney’s winning 50-plus seats in Quebec: the founding of an entirely new Reform Party which, within three elections, was itself Canada’s new official Opposition. The irony is that the success of the second conservative movement guaranteed the near extermination of the first. And this divided Right made for easy pickings and guaranteed the Liberals under Chretien/Martin four consecutive terms in power.

It took an agonizingly slow process—including the formation of the Canadian Alliance (CA) and the eventual merger of the CA with the remaining rump of PCs—to recreate a single, new, and integrated conservative party in Canada. Under the leadership of Stephen Harper, the (re)united Conservatives, were almost instantly rewarded with government, in the face of a particularly divided Left (Liberals/NDP/Bloc and Green).

Harper’s time in office also revealed just how hard it is to shift the centre in this country. Even small nudges to the status quo brought howls of anguish from its beneficiaries, amplified by a mainstream media inclined to believe that the status quo was in fact holy writ and it was blasphemy to amend.

And then Justin Trudeau.

A long way to get to my point regarding polarization. If the second half of the 20th century was a benign period with a strong bias towards the centre, it was in large part a response to the appalling human consequences of the radical polarization seen in the first half of that century. The democracies did win, but only at great cost, when the extremes of the Left (Stalinist Communism) contested for dominance with the extremes of the Right (Hitler’s National Socialism).

Some see politics as a continuum, and those who do, describe a barbell with a slim connecting bar holding together two heavy bulbous ends. In this metaphor, the centre is the slim connecting bar. If the ends get too large, or if the connecting bar gets too thin, then it will break—“the centre will not hold.” Other political scientists argue that this continuum is actually circular with the extremes of the Left and Right meeting at the back/bottom of the circle. One of The Hub’s founding editors has recently described the unnerving number of policy areas where Donald Trump’s vice-presidential candidate JD Vance has espoused views that match closely with the most progressive extremists increasingly driving today’s Democratic Party. That would be a vivid illustration of the potentially circular nature of policy and politics at the extremes.

But I do not believe the logical or sensible Conservative response to this current polarization should be to simply revert to the traditional, centrist, status quo deal. For several important reasons.

First, because that traditional deal has meant increasingly bad policy for Canada. Weak economic growth, low productivity, an abandonment of key strategic, competitive advantages (effective exploitation of our natural resources, control over the quantity/quality of immigrants, etc.) a complete/wanton disregard of our obligations as a democratic nation to ensure adequate defence capacity for our own sovereignty in the North or our NATO allies, the continued granting of bail to repeat, violent offenders…the list goes on. To describe the status quo as broken appears to me to be almost polite.

Second, the current federal Liberal Party is no longer capable of honouring their part of that traditional bargain. Central to the old “deal” was a commitment from both parties of the centre that they would not tolerate the extremes within their fold. The NDP/Liberals worked to ensure that their tent did not encompass avowed Communists. And the Conservatives committed to ensure that no white, ethno-nationalist strain of lunatics were allowed inside their tent. Today’s multi-racial and open Conservative Party shows no tolerance for the foul strains of this nationalist or racism. However, the liberal Left parties no longer seems capable of honouring their part of this bargain. It’s no longer traditional “Communism” which is infecting their party. In some ways it is something even worse.

Today’s progressive Left is guided by a comprehensive worldview that seems to equate evil with a so-called colonialist and patriarchal hierarchy that its exponents are on a mission to deconstruct with messianic fervour. This extremist worldview is deathly serious. And insane, as it views all issues through a single, race-based lens (substituting out Marx’s class-based filter for something equally myopic).

Its logical outcome is fundamentally in opposition to all the centre’s traditional, Western, liberal democratic values. It appears that, in their hearts, today’s Liberal Party believes these people are right. Many of its members certainly share the ideology of the climate extremists, who are demanding no less than the unilateral abandonment of the blessings we have all received from the output of a well-regulated capitalist economy. These two extremist cadres now control both Canada’s Liberals and NDP. The net result is a governing coalition that has nothing but contempt for its own country—our history, our citizens, and, in fact, anyone who does not share this reductionist and destructive worldview. Today’s Liberal Party is on a mission to transform us into something only tenured professors in love with acronyms like DEI and ESG could dream up.

The good news is that the people of Canada are not ready to go there. The upswelling in support for the federal Conservatives in recent months—including among newer Canadians—has several explanations.

First is the utterly normal and healthy belief that, after so many terms in power for a single party, it is time for a change. Second, there is clearly some voter exhaustion with the sonic torture that listening to our unctuous and condescending incumbent PM entails. Far more significant, the strong lead of the Conservatives in all recent polls is directly correlated with a near-universal appetite for a restoration of common sense in government. A government led by people who do not appear to hold their fellow citizens in such low regard.

In this time, when the traditional natural governing party has lost its way, unable or unwilling to purge its extremist elements and ideologies, there is now room for Canada’s Conservative Party to carve out a new centre. Common sense elements of this will logically include:

  • A restoration of fiscal balance;
  • a new agenda to restore Canada’s capacity for higher productivity and economic growth (including marginal income tax rates with an upper bound below 50 percent);
  • a strategic approach to immigration;
  • a renewed commitment to an effective and efficient federal civil service, executing its core functions with professionalism while leaving the provinces to do their jobs with less interference;
  • a justice system that successfully puts criminals before the courts, keeps repeat and violent offenders incarcerated before trial and, upon conviction, in jail for appropriately lengthy sentences;
  • a recognition that the single best thing Canada can do to help the planet reach net-zero is to successfully export our natural gas to China and India so they can stop burning thermal coal;
  • the realization that Canada can have no credible foreign policy without spending two percent of GDP on our armed forces within the first term of a new government;
  • a commitment to reconciliation with First Nations based on private property rights and by ensuring they share fully in our natural resource (and other) riches;
  • enabling innovation in service delivery to fix our no-longer-best-in-class health-care system;
  • And a renewed commitment to balance in regard to where the state and the family intersect on issues of public health.

This whole list will madden the Left. But to the centrist majority in Canada, these items are just common sense. And that is exactly why this opportunity to shift the centre is generational.

Ontario’s Mike Harris first created the “Common Sense” brand—which Poilievre has now firmly adopted as his own—in the 1990s. Ontario had fallen on very tough times and there was a huge majority of the electorate ready to respond to proposals for major change. Harris delivered that change in style. And in so doing, shifted the political centre in Ontario.

I believe there are three points in particular about Harris’ Common Sense Revolution (CSR) which could be particularly instructive for the Conservative Party leader and those crafting his campaign strategy.

First, the reason the CSR is remembered today, when so many other platforms since are long forgotten, is not because it was a central element of an unexpectedly successful Canadian political campaign (although it was that). Rather, it is because Harris then diligently went about actually implementing the rich and well-thought-out policy content of that platform. And he won a second majority, with an increased plurality, primarily because he had done when he said he would do. It is a mistake to think that the CSR was just good marketing. It was not just a meme. True common sense requires a robust policy framework with a comprehensive array of actual planned actions.

The second point is that Mike Harris’ opponents tried to tar him as a right-wing extremist, using the traditional progressive Left strategy that had worked so often before. They failed because Harris’s common sense agenda actually spoke to the broad centrist majority of Ontario. The policies he articulated and implemented were seen by the majority of Ontarians as perfectly reasonable, sensible, and long overdue.

Finally, a critical component of the Harris political strategy was to demonstrate a true commitment to change by forcefully articulating policies guaranteed to enrage the mainstream media, and then reaffirming commitment to these policies in the face of the ensuing controversy. But the choice of policies was deliberate and directly aligned with his thinking around re-defining the centre. Policies such as mandatory work for welfare (1995) or mandatory teacher-testing (1999) were seen by the Left as extreme. But the Harris team knew these so-called wedge issues were in fact supported by the vast majority of target “persuadable” voters. Issue selection is key.

It is always tempting for Conservatives to poke the Left for amusement. Or deliberately showcase policies to reinforce support from the core. Poilievre and his team must eschew this temptation. Common sense victories are won by speaking to the accessible majority. And the policies selected for focus should always be those that help broaden out a centre-right coalition.

These practical political stratagems were central to Harris’ success in redefining the centre and creating a powerful and lasting common sense brand. But, Harris is a rare exemplar of a Canadian conservative able to achieve both sustained political success and transformational policy consequences. In the second part of this essay (in The Hub next Saturday), I will discuss some lessons from Harris’ time in government and what they can teach Poilievre about how to be a transformational prime minister.

Alister Campbell

Alister Campbell served as the "message guy" in the Mike Harris' Common Sense Revolution election campaign of 1995 and is editor of the recently published essay collection The Harris Legacy....

Richard Shimooka: Enough with the missed deadlines and massive overspending. Here’s how to fix Canada’s military procurement problems

Commentary

An F-35A Lightning II fighter jet flies over Ottawa, Sept. 6, 2019. Adrian Wyld/The Canadian Press.

Defence 2.0: Reforming Canadian national defence

The past installments of this Defence 2.0 series have focused on broader issues surrounding the Department of National Defence, the military, and the role of Parliament. This week will focus on a specific area in dire need of reform: procurement. 

The war in Ukraine has made it abundantly clear that procurement matters—a lot. The ability to acquire capabilities quickly and at a scale that can make a difference on a battlefield has consumed the discussions at NATO for the past two years. Perhaps the most important realization is that procurement strategy is an integral part of an overall war strategy. The ability to ensure that your forces are able to acquire cutting-edge capabilities at production scales commensurate to actual usage is vital. Yet in Canada, this entire debate has barely made a ripple in the political discourse.

Canada needs a procurement system that is fit for purpose, yet what it currently has is anything but. The examples of missed deadlines and massive overspending are, unfortunately, too numerous to succinctly recount.

The failure to replace equipment on time and budget with capabilities commensurate to the threats that Canada faces has had serious consequences for the armed forces and the country’s security writ large. On the whole, our aging equipment base is largely obsolete compared to what adversaries field, and it also drives up costs as their maintenance requirements increase. It contributes to the many other issues that the Armed Forces personnel face like surrounding quality of life and further saps morale and retention.

A serious approach would require a major change to the system, with an eye to addressing, either immediately or eventually, the major issues that afflict military procurements.

Unfortunately, the issues afflicting the system do not neatly reside within the Department of National Defence. Rather, five different departments are substantially involved in procurement. Alongside DND, they include Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC), Industry, Science and Economic Development, the Treasury Board, and the Justice Department. Part of the problem with this arrangement is that while PSPC is nominally the “lead” department, in practice it is more like a first among equals. The lack of clearly designated authority effectively allows each department to wield a veto over the process until its particular concerns are addressed in some way.

Given the widespread issues that currently afflict procurement, anything less than a major overhaul is highly unlikely to have any serious impact. The existing system has been incrementally developed over the past 40 years, and a large amount of policy and process deadwood has been allowed to accumulate. A clean break is required.

Fundamentally, Canada should create a new agency responsible for defence procurement, one that is empowered to make adjudications between competing procurement priorities. This is not a new proposal. The Liberal Party had it as part of its 2019 campaign plank, but it never implemented the promise after the election. Moreover, many of these plans are fairly superficial in their forethought: they are predicated on the view that drawing new lines and boxes on an org chart would be sufficient to reform the procurement system. However if the reorganization will essentially recreate the existing dynamics in the new agency, it will have little to no impact.

The key opportunity that creating a dedicated defence procurement agency provides is the ability to introduce new systems, processes, culture, and even personnel to achieve better outcomes.

The overriding objective of the reorganization should be to focus on adopting a single point of accountability model for procurement. The U.S. government instituted a similar model for defence acquisitions after facing similar challenges to Canada. The benefits have been clear. It creates clear lines of authority, where one individual is charged with the authority for overseeing all aspects of a given program—and, crucially, is given the required resources to see it through.

The first step would be to aggregate as much of the responsibility into the new agency as possible. Instead of having five departments/agencies involved in a procurement, a single agency would be responsible for managing the various policy objectives for a procurement internally.

This would replace the current system of diffuse responsibility that pervades the defence procurement system today, which effectively requires unanimity among major players to advance a project. This approach does not necessarily mean that other objectives such as economic development and value for money are discarded. Arguably the current system does a poor job of ensuring those objectives are met anyway. Rather, programs using this system take the objectives into account and develop a policy that balances various trade-offs. In some cases, it discards the idea that every program can meet every objective and prioritize specific outcomes, such as urgent delivery, best value, best capability, or domestic industrial development.

Properly implemented, this approach can be quite flexible, which is vital for the varied nature of procurement programs today. Many, if not most programs, are heavily reliant on embedded electronic capabilities, including in the cyber domain. which are fundamentally different to manage from traditional physical systems. Similarly, the push for greater interoperability between capabilities requires a more robust approach to acquisition than what currently exists.

It should be noted that not all functions can be folded into such an agency. The Treasury Board’s oversight functions would likely remain independent, and the individual services would remain as the initiator of programs and drive their requirements as well. Nevertheless, consolidating program management as much as possible would greatly improve outcomes.

For the single point of accountability system to work, program managers require an experienced, highly technical staff supporting them to achieve success. They can identify potential issues before they start, devise policies to mitigate risk and costs, and generally help shepherd programs to achieve the best possible outcomes. However, achieving this requires the government to address its current challenges with retaining technical staff within DND.

At present many subject matter experts, after decades of services either in uniform and/or as part of the public service, have left to work as contractors for government—often in the same role they did before. There are a variety of factors behind the decision to become a contractor, but the lack of compensation and resources as well as difficult working conditions are common refrains.

What the creation of a defence procurement agency needs to do is cultivate and concentrate these unique sets of individuals, then try to keep them “in-house” for as long as possible. One would hope that the new working environment would work to retain many individuals, but it is more than that. Their technical expertise often would allow them to fetch much higher salaries in the private sector.

The government has one more tool to address this challenge. It involves a rarely used provision called Separate Employer Status (SES). This allows the organization to manage its collective bargaining, staff relations, and compensation matters independently from the government of Canada, in order to better manage its own human resources. It is generally employed in places where the staff situation is unique and requires greater flexibility than in the rest of the public service. A 2023 study on reforming Global Affairs Canada recommended that the department utilize SES because of its heterogeneous workforce that had a diverse array of roles. That fits the description of other departments that currently operate under the status: CSIS and the Canada Revenue Agency.

Considering the highly technical nature of defence procurement and the premium skilled professionals that operate in this field command in the private sector, SES could be a key tool to attract and retain these key individuals. That flexibility would allow the agency to provide more attractive compensation for the unique workforce it manages on a day-to-day basis. While this may come under some criticism, the widespread use of former officials as contractors is just a costlier, less effective approach to achieve the same ends.

It is important to note that this transition will not be easy. It’s quite likely that the public service would object to a number of aspects of the shifts, especially where the SES is involved. It will require significant legal effort and multi-party political support to establish. Several of the departments will object to having their responsibility hived off to a new Agency, but that can be worked through if the political will exists.

And must be worked through—Canada has been exceedingly fortunate its military has not been seriously called on in an emergency in quite some time. But fortune is not a strategy, and as things stand the country finds itself extraordinarily unprepared to respond in any major way if needed. We must act now to fix our procurement processes while we still can and before it’s too late.

Richard Shimooka is a Hub contributing writer and a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute who writes on defence policy.

00:00:00
00:00:00