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Michael Bonner: Welcome to the world of the pseudo-historians, where Churchill bashers and Putin apologists rule the day

Commentary

Protesters stand on the statue of former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in London, June 3, 2020. Kirsty Wigglesworth/AP Photo.

Imagine trying to have a leisurely chat with an old man who begins to hold forth about a jumble of half-understood historical anecdotes. When these are exhausted, he launches into a conspiratorial rant about international currency exchanges and inchoate explanations for the outbreak of the Second World War. If you happened to catch Tucker Carlson’s interview with Vladimir Putin earlier this year, you do not need to imagine such an interaction.

And if you caught Tucker’s podcast more recently, you might have noticed a much younger man—a millennial, in fact—discoursing in much the same mode. It was a farrago of half-truths and falsehoods, and the weirdest part of it centred on the Second World War, its causes, and the leadership of the main belligerents. This was Carlson’s interview of Darryl Cooper, an internet pseudo-historian of the 20th century.

Cooper’s exposition of WW2 historiography is riddled with errors, omissions, and exaggerations. Churchill, says Cooper, was really a warmonger, a terrorist, and the “chief villain” of WW2; what everyone else calls the Holocaust was an accidental by-product of logistical failures; and Hitler just wanted peace with the British Empire and, as Cooper has noted elsewhere, “an acceptable solution to the Jewish problem.” Those are only the most bizarre of Cooper’s claims, and all have been usefully analysed and debunked by Victor Davis Hanson and Sohrab Ahmari, not to mention numerous corrective threads on X.

The trouble is not incomplete information, but rather the premise from which Cooper begins. He assumes not only that WW2 is “just profoundly misunderstood,” but that it is also misinterpreted in a specific way for a specific reason. We are not allowed, Cooper says, to question any aspect of WW2 or the interwar period, because it is all “such a core part of a state religion.” Cooper seems to believe that there is an official history of WW2, that governments forbid the questioning of that narrative, and, since that is the case, that narrative must be false.

That reasoning is obviously fallacious and is easily refuted. There is, for instance, a school of thought (famously exemplified in English by the historian A. J. P. Taylor) whereby Nazism was not an aberration from, but the fulfillment of, the whole course of German history and a profound flaw in the German character. Hitler was accordingly a German statesman like any other but only more so—a view which is arguably more unsettling than Cooper’s caricature whereby the Weimar Republic suddenly “turned into demons,” as he says, and elected Hitler.

Now, the internet is full of cranks; and such a haystack of untruths, half-truths, and exaggerations would not normally excite comment. But Cooper’s interview clearly struck a nerve. The impetus was Cooper’s claim that the story of WW2 is “a core part of a state religion” and “the founding myth of the global order that we’re living in now.” “We’re going to get to a point,” he says, “where the interwar period and the Second World War are far enough away that people start taking a more honest look at everything that went on.” Cooper, like many internet crackpots, never makes his point explicit. But what he seems to suggest is this: American supremacy is illegitimate because it is founded on an erroneous narrative of WW2; exposing the errors of that narrative will accordingly undermine that dominance.

Once again: none of that reasoning follows logically. But there is a very obvious sense in which victory in WW2 is indeed the foundation of the liberal world order and present-day American hegemony. Confronting both forms of totalitarianism in Europe was in the interest of the Anglo-American world, even if it meant the loss of the British Empire. Cooper has suggested in a tweet that Nazi domination of Europe would have been preferable to the events of real history. But, leaving that odd claim aside, it made sense to knock out the Nazis first since they occupied Europe’s industrial heartland, and they could not be allowed to get any stronger than they already were.

It made sense, moreover, to destroy the Nazis in cooperation with the people who had the most to lose from Nazi ambitions in Eastern Europe: the Soviet Union. This was a brief alliance of convenience, which no one expected to last long. But instead of a direct military confrontation with the USSR, America and her allies created the international system that still exists, along with NATO, the United Nations, the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the European Union, and all the rest of it, in order to insulate the free world against Soviet encroachment and to wait patiently for its collapse. American historian Sarah C. Paine has a clear and succinct exposition of those developments and their significance here.

The plan worked. The entities and arrangements of liberal or rules-based order have all outlasted the Soviet Union; and as frustrating as they can be, they are better than the alternative of armed conflict between world powers. Nevertheless, many people are very unhappy with them, and sometimes for strange reasons. Cooper and his ilk vastly overstate the extent to which those international institutions have drifted to the Left. They have indeed done so, but far less than, say, your typical city council in almost any Western country. That said, a contemporary leftist slant could hardly have been built into the international system in the 1940s, and more recent ideological developments were arguably caused by conservative indifference and failure to remain engaged.

But it isn’t just the liberal international order and American hegemony. Unfortunately, WW2 is also part of the myth of 20th-century totalitarianism and 21st-century autocracy. Victory in that war gave legitimacy (if that is the right word) to the domination of Eastern Europe by the USSR. And the myth of the Great Patriotic War, as the Russians call WW2, is the main principle of post-Soviet Russian nationalism. The theory that the defeat of the Nazis may not have been complete is one of the most implausible excuses for the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and yet it is repeated incessantly by Russian domestic propaganda to the effect that destroying the “Nazi regime” in Kyiv will finish the job that the Red Army once started.

There is, of course, no truth to that propaganda. Perhaps that is where “a more honest look” at WW2 could more usefully begin. We can start with the fact that ideology was no barrier to cooperation between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union. In fact, the USSR did more than anyone else to enable Nazism and to encourage WW2. I am not thinking only of the Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact, but also of the German-Soviet Trade and Credit Agreement (both signed in 1939) which gave the Nazis the resources they needed to begin the war despite the British naval blockade of Germany. And on the eve of the war, both ideological states were said to be united in mutual opposition to the capitalist democracies of the West. That is what the Soviet chargé d’affaires Georgi Astakhov said to the German diplomat Julius Schnurre a few weeks before the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

That state of affairs will always pose a problem for Soviet and Putinist triumphalism. Or rather it would pose a problem if the facts were widely known. But the problem doesn’t end here, because Western liberalism, alas, does not emerge unscathed from WW2. Just as the Nazis and Soviets cooperated when it suited them, so too did the capitalist Allies make common cause with the USSR for the reasons I described above. A gigantic amount of economic and military aid flowed into Moscow to help defeat the Third Reich, and the USSR would almost certainly have been destroyed without it—though no Soviet or latterly Russian apologist will admit this.

And, speaking of Russian apologists, the transformation of the Soviet victory in WW2 into a story of Russian triumphalism is the worst of the “profound misunderstandings” of WW2 mythology. The Soviet Union lost some 27 million people in that war, but only about half were Russian. And if we view war dead as a percentage of population, Belarus, Ukraine, Latvia, and Armenia were hardest hit with respective death tolls at 25 percent, 16 percent, 13.7 percent, and 13.6 percent. And yet, the Russian sacrifice in the Great Patriotic War was the only one that was ever officially acknowledged in the Soviet Union, lest the self-conception of other nationalities take root too deeply. One of the many lies at the centre of the Soviet system was that it was an international union and not the Russian Empire back from the dead. Putin’s zombie imperialism is ironically more honest in this regard.

The time will come soon when not only all participants in WW2 are dead, but so is everyone who knew them. My young children are unusually lucky in having known their nearly 100-year-old great-grandfather for a short while before he died. He had fought in WW2, and my kids are unlikely to meet another veteran. I grew up hearing my own grandparents talk constantly of the war they lived through and fought in, and it almost felt as though WW2 was still a current event. Those days are over now. Soon there will only be second-hand memories, and these will fade unless we can keep them alive. If we don’t, the outcome will not be a “more honest look” at anything, but oblivion and ignorance.

Michael Bonner

Dr Michael Bonner is a political consultant and former Director of Policy within the Government of Ontario. He is also a historian of ancient Iran and is the author of the new book In Defense of Civilization: How Our Past Can Renew Our Present.

‘A tragic, wasteful, horrible, no-exit predicament’: Five takeaways from David Frum’s discussion of Israel’s ongoing war

Commentary

Lior, twin sister of Israeli reserve soldier Major Dor Zimel, mourns during his funeral in Even Yehuda, Israel, April 22, 2024. Ariel Schalit/AP Photo.

In a recent episode of “In Conversation with David Frum,” Frum and The Hub’s editor-at-large Sean Speer marked the one-year anniversary of Hamas’ October 7th attack on Israel by discussing the current state of the conflict, including recent Iranian missile attacks, how Canada and the United States have responded, and what may be in store for Israel and the broader region moving forward.

Five key takeaways from that conversation are set out below. The following has been edited and condensed for clarity.

1. This has always been a regional war 

“We hear a lot about escalation and regional conflict. What do those terms mean? We have just had, twice in one year, a massive barrage from Iran across the airspace of Iraq and Jordan into Israel of hundreds of ballistic missiles–and other technologies too, drones, cruise missiles–with light injuries, mercifully. Then you hear people say, ‘We must avoid a regional war. We must avoid escalation.’ Well, if the largest back-to-back ballistic missile attacks in history—ones that go from one country to another across two other states’ airspace— doesn’t mean we have not already escalated, what do those terms mean?

“I think one thing we have learned as we near this anniversary, is that it was always a regional war. This, from the beginning, was not a territorial dispute of what should be the exact borders of Gaza. This was always internationally funded, internationally based, internationally supported terrorist groups attacking, across borders, the sovereign state of Israel. I think we have more clarity on that. I wonder if one of the lessons of the past year was that the escalation is going to happen, whether you want it or not, so maybe take control of it and try to get to the end of it, rather than prolonging the nightmare.”

2. Iran must pay a heavy price

“At this point, the Iranians are making a habit of this. This is like every six months. They have to pay a significant price. Iran used to conduct a lot of terrorist operations on European and Western Hemisphere soil: two terrible, atrocious bombings in Argentina in the early 1990s, an assassination in Berlin. At the culmination of this wave, Western governments did something. I don’t know exactly what it was, but it must have hurt, because the Iranians abruptly stopped. They stop when they pay a price. They don’t stop when they pay no price. So they need to pay a price, and something that is important to them must be taken away from them.

“How the different governments coordinate that—whether it’s something visible, like the oil refineries or the nuclear program, or something less visible, like their presence in Syria—they have to pay a price or this will continue. They are not doing good risk calculation, so someone must help them with the math.”

3. The isolationists are wrong. America must support its allies in times of crisis

“I hear this [isolationist] argument. To me it sounds like: ‘I really want to assure the bank that I’m going to be able to meet my mortgage obligations. So what I’m going to do is default on the electric bill, default on the water bill, default on the credit card bill, and hoard all the money so the bank can see that I’m really ready to pay the mortgage.’ The bank wants to see that you are meeting your obligations, all of them.

“It is a decreasingly large planet, and it is interconnected. So the idea that you can somehow muster the force to meet the Chinese in Asia while betraying allies all over the place—the line of policy that is recommended by this school of thought—teaches the Chinese the lesson that, under pressure, the Americans abandoned their friends. They’ve abandoned their friends in Europe. They’ve abandoned their friends in the Middle East. Put some more pressure on them, they’ll abandon their friends in Asia, too.”

“As to American leadership in the world, I mean, we are just reminded how indispensable it is. This idea that the United States can withdraw from here but be credible over there—the planet isn’t that big, and the United States is that big. So the United States has global responsibilities. Obviously, it doesn’t have infinite resources. It has to have priorities, more here, less there. But it needs to think of global politics as a global system. Not as a set of rooms, one of which you can go into and one of which you can exit from.”

4. Canada’s response has been woefully inadequate

“I think on this, the Trudeau government looks ridiculous and pathetic. I mean, it looks like a lab rat that is getting zapped from two contradictory currents and is just scurrying around saying, ‘We condemn the violence against Israel.’ Zap. ‘Okay, okay, but we also condemn [Israel’s self-defence].’ Why are they bothering?

“At this point, the Trudeau government has brought Canada’s foreign policy standing to such a low point that I’m not sure that anyone in the region even notices what Canada says about this or that. So maybe just give up the whole thing until you’ve built some equities where Canada has something useful to contribute. The Trudeau foreign policy is very clear. You do or say whatever is necessary to affect polls in swing ridings in the next 12 hours, and you don’t worry if any of your statements are in any way consistent with or contradictory to those statements you made 12 hours ago for your last set of immediate polling needs.

“Where Canada ought to be is first regenerating its capacity to be a good citizen in international terms, to be a respected ally, to have its voice heard in the council of nations. And then it needs a foreign policy that is driven by international security concerns, not the swing-riding needs of a decaying government.”

5. There are no good outcomes to this war

“There are no good outcomes here. It’s just a terrible tragedy. The suffering on the Palestinian side will be intense. Gaza will not be rebuilt fast. The loss of potential opportunity for everybody is just terrible. There are no good outcomes here. I mean, it’s just a tragic, wasteful, horrible, no-exit predicament. The things you hear in Washington from the Biden administration, they have this vision that we’ll stand up some kind of substitute authority in Gaza, it’ll be somehow linked to a reformed and de-corrupted Palestinian Authority, and then the Arab states will pay for it. Well, if they can pull it off, good luck to them.

“But it sounds like a lot of wishful thinking. The best outcome here is that Iran gets the lesson of its life, and that without massive force, the Iranian nuclear program is halted in its tracks, and that we get some kind of stability between Israelis and Palestinians and some kind of security system and some kind of humanitarian (aid). But it’s not going to be good. What Hamas did on October 7 committed Palestinians, Israelis, everybody, to a path of tragedy from which I don’t see any good escape.”

“From the beginning, I saw this as just something that had no good outcomes. It was just pure loss. I think that now. But I mean, Israel has in the past week successfully damaged the power of Hezbollah, successfully damaged the credibility of the Iranian regime. That is a plus I suppose, and not just for Israel, but for everyone in the region who is terrorised by Hezbollah and fearful of Iran. That’s something snatched from this colossal human ruin.”

The Hub Staff

The Hub’s mission is to create and curate news, analysis, and insights about a dynamic and better future for Canada in a single online information source.

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