In a recent interview with The Hub, foreign policy advisor Michael O’Hanlon outlined both the strengths and limitations of current missile-based systems while cautioning against overinvestment in unproven technologies. The former member of the Pentagon’s Defence Policy Board provided critical insights into how the U.S. and its allies should approach evolving threats from North Korea, Iran, and advanced adversaries like China and Russia.
Here are five key takeaways from the conversation:
- Existing U.S. defence systems can defend Canada: O’Hanlon said the current Alaska-California-based defence system is capable of protecting Canada in its current state.
- Space-based weapons are impractical: President Trump’s proposed “Golden Dome” initiative, which would see the development of a defence shield that intercepts missiles mid-flight, using space-based interceptors and hypersonic defence, is something Canada should be skeptical of, as it relates to militarizing space.
- A viable alternative for North Korea and Iran: O’Hanlon suggested that boost-phase interception (a brief 60-300 second window when the missile has just launched) is a probable way to counter missiles that could come from burgeoning nuclear powers like Iran and North Korea, which has already been developing its Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).
- China and Russia pose an overwhelming challenge: The rise of China and Russia’s combined nuclear power will soon outpace the West—and it is important to respond accordingly.
- Integrated air and missile defence is crucial, but should not break the bank: Investing in drones and cruise missiles, as demonstrated in the recent Ukrainian attack on the Russian aircraft, is worthwhile.
Existing U.S. missile systems can defend Canada—but only against limited threats
O’Hanlon emphasized that the current U.S. missile defence system, known as the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) based in Alaska and California, is already capable of protecting Canada, at least against a potential North Korean attack. The system, developed in the early 2000s and upgraded since, leverages around 44 interceptor missiles with a roughly 50 percent success rate in tests.
“What you really need [is a] multi-layered defence,” he said. “We should improve our own current North American defence system and expand it.”
Canada is going to get protection whether it participates in the architecture of a project like the Golden Dome or not, by virtue of its geographic proximity to the U.S., he explained.
Space-based weapons are impractical
The idea of space-based missile defence, such as Donald Trump’s proposed Golden Dome initiative, a U.S. defence shield that would intercept missiles mid-flight, has gained traction in some circles. However, O’Hanlon dismissed the concept as financially and technically unfeasible. Deploying interceptors or lasers in orbit would require a vast constellation of systems to maintain, making it prohibitively expensive and vulnerable, as these lasers and interceptors need to be within Earth’s orbit and fire at targets accurately. Instead, he advocated for improved space-based sensors to enhance tracking and targeting for existing ground systems.
“I [end up] being a big skeptic on weaponizing space,” he concluded.
Boost-phase interception offers a viable alternative for North Korea and Iran
For near-term threats like North Korea, O’Hanlon suggested focusing on boost-phase interception—destroying missiles shortly after launch. The U.S. could, for example, with their missile defence systems in the Asia-Pacific region, target North Korean ICBMs in their initial flight phase.
Iran, which lacks ICBMs capable of reaching North America but may develop them in the future, presents a trickier challenge due to its size and geography. Still, O’Hanlon noted that U.S. allies like Turkey could provide bases for airborne interceptors.
China and Russia pose an overwhelming challenge—but limited defences could still matter
The most daunting scenario is an all-out strike from China or Russia, whose combined nuclear arsenals will soon dwarf the U.S. and its allies.
“[We have to] decide [if] we’re going to compete with them and try to equalize or build some defences that could at least neutralize a limited fraction of the overall Russian and Chinese capability,” he commented.
Integrated air and missile defence is crucial—and doesn’t have to break the bank
Recent conflicts, including Ukraine’s strikes on Russian aircraft, highlight the use of drones and cruise missiles in warfare. O’Hanlon urged a broader approach to air defence, one that goes beyond ICBMs to counter these lower-altitude threats.
He pointed to existing U.S. Navy and Army systems, like Aegis and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), which could be adapted for homeland defence, without exorbitant costs.
Generative AI assisted in the production of this article using content from The Hub’s YouTube channel.
