The question is not whether liberty should be ordered, but how

Commentary

People at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at the National War Memorial in Ottawa, Jan. 30, 2022. Justin Tang/The Canadian Press.

Is the New Right a radical reimagining of Canadian conservatism, or simply a reminder of what it has been?

A comprehensive rebuttal to a largely incomprehensible column is a waste of time, but Jesse Kline’s contribution to a debate sparked by a galère of young conservative writers over the proper role of the state is ripe for fisking. Because Kline’s piece runs to almost 2,000 words—the Ruby Tuesday’s salad bar of word salads—to save time I’ll forgo the customary throat-clearing introduction and jump right in. Kline’s words are in pull quotes; my brief and sometimes not-so-brief responses are interlineated below.

Let’s go:

Anyone who lived through the 1990s and early 2000s knows that when the Canadian right is divided, electoral success is next to impossible to achieve. Yet a new movement — largely driven by younger people and adopting some of the views espoused by big-government loving, free-market skeptical MAGA Republicans — is threatening to do just that.

Well, we’re not off to a good start. Not two sentences in and Kline is already smearing his opponents with the MAGA label. How long can it be before Godwin’s Law kicks in? Let’s start the clock.

As then-Canadian Alliance leader Stephen Harper noted back in 2003, the conservative movement in Canada has long rested on an alliance between “the economic and social conservative sides.” But if you listen to people on the so-called new right — also known as “national conservatism” or “postliberalism” — it was always a marriage of convenience rather than shared ideology.

Note that Harper was warning about a partisan divide on the Right, not calling for the stifling of debate within one party, let alone more broadly among conservatives. So far, Kline hasn’t identified a problem. Debates between libertarians and conservatives are nothing new, and political parties are always marriages of convenience, and typically polygamous marriages or, more often, an orgy of swinging factions looking to hook up with a temporarily willing partner for …. I’ll end the metaphor there, but you get the drift.

Writing in the Without Diminishment Substack newsletter last week, policy consultant Alex MacDonald argued that, “While the fusionist project in Canada promised to wed the supposed mutual values of economic libertarians and social traditionalists into an intellectually coherent and principled conservative coalition to be electorally viable, we have instead witnessed the social conservatives become the concubine of the economic libertarians.”

Part of the problem, he argues, is that, “The libertarian mindset has gained purchase in far more than just economic questions. That is, conservatives have become skeptical of the state in general, not just as it interfaces with the economy. The state, we are told, ought to be neutral. Any calls for the state to wield its power in defence of traditional values is tantamount to the woke-progressive co-opting of the state, and therefore must be despised.”

It’s a compelling narrative — and one that has been espoused by many other nominally conservative writers in this country — but it does not tell the full story. The “fusionist” alliance between libertarians and social conservatives was forged during the Cold War, when both factions united in their shared opposition to the Soviet Union and the threat of global communism. But it was more than a mere coalition of conservatives opposed to Soviet atheism and libertarians looking to protect free markets.

It was more…but not much more. As I have written before, fusionism was a marriage of convenience and a morganatic one at that, without a legitimate heir. The Cold War is over; arguing about what fusionism should look like today is like arguing about the legitimate King of France. Even at the time, the editors of National Review were far from enthusiastic about the compromise (Russell Kirk famously refused to appear on the masthead with Frank Meyer). Compromise is necessary in politics, but it is a flaccid rallying cry.

In the 20th century, many of the leading thinkers on the American right — such as Barry Goldwater, William F. Buckley Jr., George Will and Ronald Reagan — firmly believed in individual liberty, free markets and limited government, even though many of them held socially conservative views.

While making a fair point, Kline manages to miss the bigger point. Notably, all four of these men described themselves as libertarians, and though they all would be considered socially conservative by today’s standards (the current iteration of Will, not so much), each was also open to progressive policies and sometimes pushed them.

It is easy to look back and see stodgy men in grey suits and assume they were rocks of reaction, but if you look at the disagreements of the time, you will see that Kline has erased entirely the many conservatives who were arrayed against them, as well as the very different conservative traditions in Canada, Britain, and Europe that are more relevant for us.

Goldwater and Reagan were politicians of their ages (born in 1909 and 1911, respectively), whose governing philosophies were shaped by debates that are of mostly eccentric historical interest today. Their economic liberalism, for example, was forged in opposition to FDR’s New Deal: Is that really where Kline would draw the line? Throwing down the gauntlet for Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics and Lochner v New York? How many votes are there in that today?

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