Trump’s National Security Strategy: Neither national, nor secure, nor a strategy

This disjointed approach mirrors the mercurial decision-making of Trump himself. Indeed, the production of the NSS itself shows that there are multiple policy communities within the Trump administration that aim to cater to his whims. Put differently, the NSS must be read less as a strategic document than as an exercise in White House-ology—a document written for an audience of one who may never read it. Unpopular policies Analysts should thus treat it as a window into internal signaling rather than as a reliable map of future policy. Regardless, the NSS will probably not have much broad acceptance within the public or within the U.S. government itself. A major problem with the administration is that it consists not of the leading lights of the professional class that has steered previous administrations, but of universally flawed, organizational amateurs who owe their position, and their loyalty, to Trump himself. Their ineptitude has rendered them ineffective in the actual job of governing in foreign policy, leading to rather poor policy outcomes. This incompetence, in addition to the potential illegality of some decisions, has created significant organizational dysfunction for an administration that many are coming to regard as already lame duck. The reality is that the Trump administration has become deeply unpopular with policies far outside the mainstream of American foreign and even domestic policy thinking. In November 2024, a slim majority of Americans, 52 percent, supported tariffs while 48 were against. Eleven months later, the population had decisively swung against them, with only 38 percent supporting them and 62 percent against, as the reality of economic nationalism sets in. As for the U.S.’s posture to the world, 60 percent of Americans do not approve of how the administration is handling foreign relations. The underlying unpopularity of these policies calls into question their permanence in the American political landscape. Though they find some support among the more radical segments of the Republican base, even within the party these policies have found little traction. Large portions of the party’s congressional delegation remain wedded to the long-held national security orthodoxy and have increasingly pushed back against the administration. Any future presidential candidate running on such unpopular policies will risk electoral defeat, given how poorly they have fared. Many Republican candidates may yet decide to swim with the current and revert to the much more popular orthodoxy. This is not hopeful speculation. Several days after the NSS’s publication, Congress released its draft National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2026. As a policy document, the NDAA matters much more than the NSS because it, in fact, does shape the direction of U.S. defence policy, given that it has the advantage of being the law. It sets budgets and can constrain the administration’s policies through legislation. The version released last week repudiated many of the NSS’s tenets by boosting support for Ukraine as well as blocking any potential attempt to reposition U.S. capabilities in Europe, including reducing U.S. forces in the region. One might think that the Trump administration would despise the NDAA for the limits imposed on the NSS. Yet the administration’s primary objection is that it barred the renaming of bases back to Confederate leaders.  American domestic politics and American foreign policy are related but distinct arenas. The former requires navigating Congress and the courts; the latter confronts—aside from the domestic constraints identified above—the veto power of other actors in the international system. Conflating the two and assuming that what Trump says at a rally will seamlessly become geopolitical reality misreads both the constraints he faces and the agency others retain. None of this should ignore that the administration has, and will continue to, wreak immense damage to the existing Western order that has persevered over the past 80 years. Canadian foreign policy for the next three years must address this challenge, in large part through increased defence spending and smart diplomatic efforts that understand the real long-term challenges that face the country. How Canada should respond Overstating the impact of the NSS on the future trajectory of U.S. force policy could lead Canadian leaders to make policy choices that would leave Canada worse off. After all, many Canadian commentators have suggested that Ottawa must go it alone, charting an independent foreign policy and drawing much closer to counterweights such as China. Too many in Canada have fallen into a parasocial relationship with this administration, reacting to every pronouncement as though it were already policy. This approach is corrosive to strategic thinking. Playing within a framework defined entirely by White House theatrics is not conducive to the national interest. Rather, Ottawa should try to triangulate Canadian foreign and defence policies on not just the current, stated priorities of the Trump administration, but also on those foundational aspects of U.S. grand strategy that future administrations will in all likelihood embrace again once the domineering force of Trump has faded out of power. Both parties in the U.S. have called out Canada for its low defence spending and lacklustre contributions for continental defence. Making a strong effort to address these long-held concerns about Canada’s role would be beneficial. Finding these avenues can help build a much more durable foundation for bilateral relations, bring greater collective security and achieve much more prosperity when the next administration—whether Republican or Democrat—comes to power.