The Trudeau government has at long last released its strategy for Canada’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific region. For you younger people out there, please understand that Canada has been dithering on how to engage Asia since the 1970s and so I wholeheartedly welcome this contribution to the public debate. While the document rightly (and finally) recognizes that China’s disruptive behaviour conflicts with Canada’s interests and that stronger links to other countries must be cultivated, it also fails to come to terms with the full scope of China’s ambitions to influence Canada.
In short, this new strategy has the right attitude but lacks teeth.
Canada’s China policy of the past can be summed up as follows: show deference to Beijing with the hope that Chinese leaders will reward Canada by buying our products in bulk—a policy also known as the pursuit of fool’s gold. Even further disconnected from reality was the notion that increased trade with Beijing would gradually improve human rights and strengthen democratic reform, a strategy characterized by Canadian journalist Chantal Hébert as engagement with “eyes wide shut.” Although late in the game, Trudeau’s loss of innocence towards China and recognition that Japan, South Korea, and India are important partners is welcome. But is it too little too late?
The gathering storm
At the start of his time in office, Trudeau’s sunny policies towards China reflected his wide-eyed exuberance which Beijing was only too happy to exploit. However, after the Canada-China free trade humiliation and the arbitrary detention of the two Michaels, Trudeau started to understand that Beijing was playing him for a fool and pushed back on China’s hostage diplomacy. Shockingly, Trudeau was under internal pressure from Canada’s foreign policy establishment to trade Huawei executive Meng Wenzhou for the two Canadians. To his credit, Trudeau held the line.
However, one wonders if Trudeau’s newfound backbone is here to stay. Ottawa’s shift in tone was in large part the result of arm twisting by Washington to remind Canada that it needs to pick a side in what the Biden Administration has called “a decisive decade” with China.
Bureaucratic inertia is another potential hazard that could threaten the implementation of this new policy. Hard-wired not to rock the boat, Canada’s global affairs bureaucracy will be tempted to carry on as before, guided by the flawed assumption that it’s always in Canada’s interest to lock in more deals with Beijing. If that’s the case, it would be a grave mistake.
Getting it right
Making the Indo-Pacific a top priority should go without saying—it’s the global epicenter of a significant share of future economic growth in the world. Alternately, it’s also where most of the political risk lies due to the growing Sino-American Cold War as the U.S. and China continue to challenge for dominance in East Asia. This combination of high risk/high reward makes choosing the right strategy crucial and will make or break our success in the region.
What this strategy gets right is its focus on security, increasing military relationships and operations, and enhanced intelligence and cyber security networks. On trade, the strategy rightly points out that Canada needs to modernize the Investment Canada Act to better protect our national interests. We need more of that.
However, notably absent from this strategy is the complete lack of acknowledgement of political interference after recent revelations by CSIS that China directly tried to manipulate Canada’s political process and its warning that China is the “foremost aggressor” (among others) when it comes to foreign interference. Also missing were specifics on how to assist Taiwan to survive the next decade, and the creation of a federal foreign agent registry (modeled on one in Australia) forcing former senior public officials and politicians to disclose their activities.
Bet on Washington
However, what this strategy most fundamentally fails to understand in strategic terms is that our partnership with the U.S. ought to be the gateway to the Indo-Pacific region. China’s disruptive behaviour has reaffirmed Washington as the security partner of choice for many Pacific nations, presenting Canada with an opportunity to shore up support with Washington (by far our most important security partner in the Pacific) and gain favour with the emerging coalition of Indo-Pacific nations.
As a start, Canada could invest in new submarines and autonomous systems which would allow us to dispense with our aging and rickety fleet, patrol the Canadian coastline and support U.S. naval operations to defend fortress North America as the Chinese navy grows stronger every year. Siding with the U.S. is also strategically wise as the long-term odds favour Washington over Beijing for three reasons.
First, as a peaking power, China is in relative decline to other countries, such as India, which is rising at an accelerated pace. Second, China will get old before it gets rich. Without the people to work and generate income to pay for the rest of society, the demographics do not support Beijing’s long-term growth. Third, China’s private debt, particularly the real estate market, which makes up 30 percent of China’s GDP, is a ticking time bomb. It’s time we stopped pursuing fool’s gold. When it comes to choosing strategic partners, this is not a decision we should be struggling with.
A policy, if you can keep it
For the last 25 years, Canada’s relationship with China has been framed as a struggle between commercial interests versus the defence of human rights. During that time, Canada’s foreign policy establishment steadfastly defended trade with China as essential for human rights under the assumptions that it would make them live by the same global rules as everyone else, gain a billion customers for Canadian products, and strengthen the forces of domestic Chinese reform.
That misguided “willful blindness” has proven to be so utterly bankrupt that even Prime Minister Trudeau has turned against it. We must remain vigilant however to avoid backsliding into a “business as usual” mindset. Going forward the mantra ought to be: The sunny ways of the past are inadequate to the stormy present.
