Amal Attar-Guzman: Canada’s global leadership is waning. Why not expand our influence closer to home?

But while Canada has been occupied elsewhere, China and Russia looked westwards, actively increasing their largely unchecked engagement in the LAC countries. China expanded its diplomatic and economic engagement through its Belt-and-Road initiative, while Russia increased state-to-state security and military arrangements with like-minded nations, including Cuba, Venezuela, and Brazil, a key member of BRICS. Now, that’s not to say that Canada has never had an LAC strategy. Prime Minister Stephen Harper in his 2007 throne speech committed renewing the government engagement with LAC, in order to “promote [Canada’s] values and serve our interests.” This is the only prominent instance in which LAC countries were singled out and declared a core priority in Canadian foreign policy. This strategy was in response to two trends. First, while Canada’s close economic ties with the U.S. are usually not a detriment, the U.S. was going through an economic malaise in the mid-2000s, culminating in the 2008 financial crisis. It made sense for the Harper government of the day to expand its horizons and look further down south. Second, various LAC countries were going through a period of pursuing market reform and democratic development. This was an enticing prospect for mutually beneficial trade and diplomatic endeavours that could help shepherd this process along. Given the history of LAC countries, trends of economic nationalism and protectionism, as well as political populism and authoritarianism, are never far away. It made sense for Canada to actively engage the region to help ensure more market-oriented, Western-aligned outcomes. As such, Harper’s government went into overdrive and Canada secured free-trade agreements with Peru, Colombia, Panama, and Honduras. MP Diane Ablonczy was appointed as minister of state for the Americas in 2011, which was a first. Additionally, Harper had approximately six LAC tours throughout his tenure. But despite the government’s commitment, engagement in the region was not substantive or long-lasting. Harper’s LAC strategy was criticized for not being consistent, even contradictory with an on-and-off again relationship with LAC, and that the strategy was more of a photo-op than a concrete policy. Another critique was that it focused too much on business ventures while not accounting for human rights concerns. As rightly stated by former diplomat Colin Robertson, “Ambition is important. But so is perseverance.” A 2011 internal review showed an even more damning picture. The report found that Canada’s influence in the LAC region was “uncertain,” concrete action was slow post-visits, that there was a lack of specific funding, little coordination between government departments, and a lack of clear and updated messaging, advertising, or sense of priorities. Depressingly, that review succinctly captured Canada’s foreign policy execution for much of the last several decades. While Prime Minister Justin Trudeau proclaimed loudly that “Canada is back” back in 2015, the world, by and large, has begged to differ. Harper’s LAC strategy fell to the wayside as Trudeau heralded a new feminist foreign policy agenda that would be applied generally. Further, his government started to shift to new regional focus areas towards the Indo-Pacific and soon the Arctic. Compared to Harper, Trudeau spent little time visiting LAC countries and has had no official LAC tours. But while Canada shifted its focus away from the LAC region, its geopolitical challenges have become even more complex. Haiti is very quickly becoming a failed state if it is not one already. Climate change is exacerbating current migratory patterns. The U.S.-Mexican border is known as the world’s deadliest migratory land route. Ecuador is taking a turn for the worse despite Canada exploring a potential free-trade agreement with the South American nation. And no one should discount the domino effect caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the region. Now, that is not to say that there is no LAC engagement whatsoever. Global Affairs Canada has outlined an engagement strategy and goals in the region, particularly in poverty alleviation and climate financing. But forgoing Harper’s LAC strategy as a core foreign policy region was incredibly short-sighted. While not perfect, not continuing it and addressing its pitfalls has put Canada even more behind in not only addressing regional challenges but in seizing the abundant opportunities as well. The latter would be crucial if President Trump returns to office and begins to execute his highly protectionist trade policy. One major issue that needs to be addressed soon is the issue of critical minerals, and, specifically for Canada, mining and extraction. Almost half (49.2 percent) of Canadian mining assets abroad are in the LAC region, accounting for a value of $105.6 billion as of 2022, according to Natural Resources Canada. This amounts to the largest share of Canadian mining assets abroad. However, there have been reports and allegations of human rights and environmental abuses done on behalf of Canadian mining companies. Latin Americans, for their part, are fighting back and winning, as is the case with Panama. Canada has a responsibility to ensure Canadian ventures, public or private, are not exploitative. Overall, Canada’s waning world influence is becoming ever more apparent. Getting caught flat-footed in a Havana harbour is just one of many recent examples. Perhaps we should narrow our focus to key strategic areas where we can actually hold some considerable sway. The United States will always be our number one foreign policy priority. But refusing to cede regional influence to China and Russia and more actively engaging with our neighbours to the south beyond the U.S. would be a strong move towards regaining our global footing.